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Abstract 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) suffered from a series of severe economic 
crises during the 1980s and 1990s starting with Mexican debt crisis in 1982. The region 
abandoned import substitution (ISI) policies to embark upon liberalization soon after the 
debt crises. Poverty degradation and rising inequality became not only economic but 
also social and political issues in LAC during the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast to those 
prior two decades, steady growth (largely driven by the global commodity boom) and 
sound economic policies during the 2000s improved the lives of millions in the region 
over the past decade. According to a World Bank (2013) report, for the first time ever, 
the number of people belonging to the middle class surpassed the number of poor 
people, a signal of LAC progress toward becoming a middle-class region. Despite 
impressive gains during the past decade, however, the region remains unequal, with 
some 82 million people subsisting on less than $2.5 per day. Poverty and inequality 
remain as daunting social hurdles to be overcome. 
 
This dissertation describes empirical studies of poverty and vulnerability in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The studies specifically examine the cases of Haiti and 
Mexico using corresponding household survey data. LAC is, in reality, a region of 
diverse nations not only in political, historical, cultural, and climatic dimensions, but 
also in terms of economic development. In actuality, Haiti and Mexico are at opposite 
ends of the economic development spectrum among LAC. Mexico is a leading economy 
among LAC countries. It has been making the most of globalization in its economic 
development process, the most famous example of which is the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into force in 1994. With respect to the 
reduction of poverty, Mexico implemented various poverty-reduction policies that are 
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now convergent into a program known as the first conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program in the world. Despite all these efforts, Mexico suffers from high incidence of 
poverty and inequality. Haiti, in contrast, has been grappling with political instability 
and damage from natural disasters, even into the 1990s and 2000s, which have isolated 
the country almost completely from the globalized world. Consequently, Haiti remains 
an extremely poor country among world nations, with extremely high incidence of 
poverty, where a large proportion of people have no choice but to engage in subsistence 
agriculture. 
 
Consequently, studying the cases of Haiti and Mexico will provide valuable insights to 
understand the fundamental issues of poverty and vulnerability in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Their cases will enable us to draw many implications. Because Haiti and 
Mexico respectively occupy opposite ends of the spectrum, the scopes and methods for 
the study are expected to differ considerably. Considering the difficulties confronted by 
Haiti—specifically the lack of economic activities other than subsistence agriculture, an 
overly abundant rural labor force, and an extremely low level of human capital––the 
creation of sufficient job opportunities in non-agricultural sectors is urgently needed to 
reduce poverty in Haiti. 
 
Mexico is a case in contrast: an upper middle income country with a highly globalized 
and industrialized economy among LAC countries, and even among world countries. 
Poverty has been decreasing during the recent decade, in line with macroeconomic 
stability and stable growth during the period until 2008, although the incidence of 
poverty remains high. However, that favorable trend has reversed with the global crisis 
caused by the Lehman Shock. Rising international commodity prices have also affected 
poor households directly. That fact should imply that Mexican poor people are actually 
v 
 
highly vulnerable to shocks, and that global shocks immediately influence poor people. 
Studies of Mexico’s vulnerability examine the CCT effects, benefiting from the fact that 
the rural household data are designed for program evaluations. 
 
The contents of this dissertation are as follows. Chapter 1 surveys the concepts and 
measures of poverty, inequality, and vulnerability. Continuously the discussion 
emphasizes major poverty-related issues: poverty profiles and pro-poor growth. Specific 
examination suggests a macroeconomic and poverty outlook of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, especially contrasting the cases of Mexico and Haiti, thereby providing an 
introduction to studies conducted in subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 assesses the relation between poverty and employment issues in Haiti using 
the first and most comprehensive household survey in 2001. An overview of poverty 
circumstances and characteristics of household income sources leads to two empirical 
studies that were conducted. The first study, using a multinomial logit model, assesses 
occupational choice in Haiti, particularly addressing the hypothesis that the lack of job 
opportunity might be a cause of severe and persistent poverty. The second study 
estimates the probability of becoming a wage worker using a probit model. Then it 
estimates a wage equation using a sample selection model. Our findings from the 
multinomial logit model suggest that obtaining wage employment is the key to escaping 
poverty. However, such opportunities are limited to workers with secondary or higher 
education. The results also reveal that remittances are the key determinant in deciding 
whether to work or not. Regression results from the wage equation imply that education, 
living areas, and gender are important determinants of both participating in the wage 
market and raising wage income. Therefore, job creation in the non-agricultural sector 
and a larger supply of educated workers are necessary for long-run Haitian economic 
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development. 
 
Chapter 3 analyzes the vulnerability of rural households of Mexico, emphasizing the 
discussion of causality between poverty degradation and the food price increases 
between 2003 and 2007 using rural household panel data. The chapter also examines the 
degree to which the buffer effects of the CCT program function in reality on the 
consumption of the rural poor households in Mexico when facing shocks. Empirical 
results show that poverty, as measured by food consumption, worsened significantly. 
Causality is supported by the fact that households with self-consumption were able to 
cancel out the consumption decrease almost completely by the food production as the 
theory predicts. Moreover, the cash transfer of CCT served as a partial buffer, but could 
not completely protect the poor people from price shocks. 
 
Chapter 4 presents empirical analyses of risk-sharing mechanisms in rural Mexico, 
using the same rural household panel data to clarify the vulnerability of rural 
households. The study in this chapter examines vulnerability as a lack of ability to 
smooth consumption because of liquidity constraints. The empirical results reject full 
risk sharing, but they support the hypothesis that risk-sharing mechanisms in rural 
Mexico offer better insurance to secure basic needs such as food, and that they play 
important roles when households face negative income shocks. In addition, the CCT 
enhances existent risk-sharing mechanisms. The risk-sharing mechanisms, reinforced by 
CCT, serve to mitigate the liquidity constraints—the vulnerability—of poor households. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Poverty and Vulnerability 
in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
 
1-1. Introduction 
As represented by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 
most important and urgent issues in developing countries to be tackled today are poverty 
and inequality. Since the 1980s, many developing countries have implemented economic 
liberalization policies. The trend has been accelerated to catch up with and to take 
advantage of rapid globalization that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War. 
Neoliberal policies are undertaken with the idea that government intervention should be 
eliminated to the greatest degree possible so that a liberalized market can achieve sound 
economic performance and consequently engender economic growth. In addition, 
economic growth itself was expected to resolve poverty and inequality problems 
eventually through so-called trickle down effects, through which the fruits of economic 
growth pervade to poor people. 
However, high economic growth had not been observed in many liberalized developing 
economies during the 1990s, except for some Asian countries. Moreover, many researchers 
argued that poverty and inequality had been worsened during the period. These criticisms 
of neoliberal policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank compelled international organizations to emphasize development policies intended 
for sustainable development, assigning priority to the reduction of poverty and inequality. 
Less than two years remain for the targeted year of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in 2015. World Bank (2013) reveals, however, that only 4 of the 21 specific 
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targets within the eight MDG goals have been met worldwide. Sala-i-Martin (2006) argues 
that reductions in global inequality during the 1980s and 1990s are mostly attributed to the 
Asian big economies such as China and India. He concluded that the spectacular reduction 
of worldwide poverty, virtually driven by East Asia and South Asia, hides the uneven (or 
even the opposite) performance of various regions, specifically Africa, throughout the 
world. 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) suffered from a series of severe economic 
crises during the 1980s and 1990s, starting with the Mexican debt crisis in 1982. The 
region gave up import substitution (ISI) to adopt neoliberal policies soon after the debt 
crises, in line with the conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank. Poverty degradation 
and rising inequality had become not only economic but also social and political issues in 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast to those preceding 
two decades, steady growth (largely driven by the global commodity boom) and sound 
economic policies during the 2000s improved the lives of millions throughout the region 
over the past decade. However, economic inequality and poverty remain as looming social 
problems: poor people remain vulnerable. Social services and infrastructure are still of 
poor quality, as World Bank (2013) shows. 
Mexico has been a leading country not only in Latin America and the Caribbean but 
also in the world to implement and deepen the neoliberal reforms as represented by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico became a member of OECD in 
1994 and is regarded as a middle-income country in the world. However, poverty and 
inequality persist as important economic, social, and political issues in Mexico. 
Mexico is also known as the first country to invent and implement the conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program—a new and now popular targeted poverty reduction strategy in the 
world to replace the existent inefficient pork-barrel poverty reduction policies. The success 
of Mexico’s CCT program has drawn special attention from international development 
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organizations such as the World Bank, which induced other developing countries in the 
world to introduce similar poverty-reduction policies. 
Fifteen years have passed since Mexico’s CCT program was implemented. Many 
evaluations of its short-term effects have been conducted. Now the medium-term and 
long-term effects should be discussed widely so that the Mexican experiment can 
contribute to poverty reduction of other developing countries. 
Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean, has the highest poverty 
ratio and inequality in the region. It is difficult, however, to assess the economic and 
poverty status of Haiti precisely because of its history of repeated political instabilities and 
natural disasters. In fact, the Haitian economy has fallen into a negative trend since the 
coup in 1991, and even today has not recovered the level of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita that it had in 1990. 
A household survey conducted in Haiti showed that, of its population, nearly 80 percent 
live below the poverty line. About 30 percent of main household providers are unemployed 
or inactive. Furthermore, opportunities for wage employment are extremely limited (only 
10 percent of main household providers are engaged in it). Furthermore, it is estimated that 
70–80 percent of the labor force is absorbed by the informal sector (Jadotte, 2004). It is 
indeed of urgent need to seek fundamental strategies for a truly sustainable economic 
development that enables poverty reduction. Therefore, researchers must devote more 
attention to the region’s poorest country: Haiti. 
The next two sections present an overview of the concepts and measures of poverty, 
inequality and vulnerability. The discussion is focused on the major poverty-related issues, 
i.e., poverty profiles in Section 1-4 and pro-poor growth in Section 1-5. Section 1-6 
provides a macroeconomic and poverty outlook of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
especially contrasting against those of Mexico and Haiti. Section 1-7 presents the study 
aims and scope. 
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1-2. Concepts of Poverty and Vulnerability1 
According to the World Bank (2000), poverty is defined as “pronounced deprivation in 
well-being.” In the simplest approach, poverty is measured by comparing individuals’ 
income or consumption with some defined threshold: a poverty line. This most 
conventional view—poverty is regarded largely in monetary terms—is the starting point 
for most analyses of poverty. A second approach to well-being and poverty is to ask 
whether people are able to obtain a specific type of consumption good such as food, shelter, 
health, and/or education. In this view, the analysis is extended beyond the more traditional 
monetary measures of poverty. 
A key building block in developing income and consumption measures of poverty is the 
poverty line—the critical cutoff in income or consumption below which an individual or 
household is determined to be poor (World Bank, 2000). There are various types of poverty 
lines. The internationally comparable lines are useful for producing global aggregates of 
poverty. In principle, they test for the ability to purchase a basket of commodities that is 
roughly similar across the world. The most widely used international poverty lines are 
those of the World Bank: 1.25 US dollars per day per person at 2005 Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) and 2 US dollars per day per person at 2005 PPP, representing extreme 
poverty and poverty lines, respectively2. However, such a universal line is generally 
unsuitable for the analysis of poverty within the country. For that purpose, a 
country-specific poverty line must be constructed, reflecting the country’s economic and 
social circumstances. The construction of country profiles based on these country-specific 
                                                 
1
 The arguments of this section rely mainly on a report by Haughton and Khandker (2009). 
2
 The international poverty line was revised in 2008 based on results of the International 
Comparison Program (ICP) 2005, a worldwide statistical initiative to collect comparative 
price data and estimate purchasing power parities (PPP) of the world’s economies (World 
Bank, 2008). The poverty line was raised from US$ 1.08 (at 1993 PPP) to US$1.25 (at 
2005 PPP). Therefore, a simple term “US$ 1 per day per person” is also used in many 
cases for the sake of convenience. See Chen and Ravallion (2008, 2010) for details of the 
re-estimation of world poverty using the revised poverty line. 
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poverty lines is now common practice (World Bank, 2000). 
The broadest approach to well-being is the one articulated by Amartya Sen (1987), who 
argues that well-being comes from a capability to function in society. Consequently, 
poverty arises when people lack key capabilities, and so have inadequate income or 
education, or poor health, or insecurity, or low self-confidence, or a sense of powerlessness, 
or the absence of rights such as freedom of speech. Viewed in this manner, poverty is a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon and less amenable to simple solutions. For instance, while 
higher average incomes will certainly help reduce poverty, these must be accompanied by 
measures to empower poor people, or insure them against risks, or to address specific 
weaknesses such as inadequate availability of schools or corrupt health services. 
A new concept that is closely related to poverty is vulnerability. Although the definition 
tends to vary depending on contexts and researchers, vulnerability is generally defined as 
the risk of falling into poverty in the future3, even if the person is not necessarily poor now. 
It is often associated with the effects of shocks. Vulnerability is a key dimension of 
well-being because it affects individuals’ behavior in terms of investment, production 
patterns, and coping strategies, and in terms of the perceptions of their own situations. 
Some important shortcomings of the study of poverty are that it specifically examines 
people who are currently poor (or were poor in the past), which means that poverty can be 
measured only ex post. However, governments and policymakers are typically more 
interested in the effects that their measures will have in the future. For this it would be 
valuable to be able to identify those who are expected to be poor ex ante (that is, in the 
future). Such households are regarded as vulnerable to poverty. Vulnerability to poverty 
results from either low expected consumption or high variation in consumption. A welfare 
shock is commonly measured as a change in consumption per capita4. The shock could be 
                                                 
3
 Alwang et al. (2001) define poverty as “the propensity to suffer a significant welfare 
shock, bringing the household below a socially defined minimum level.” 
4
 We would overstate household well-being in good years and understate it in bad years if 
we were to use income as the measure of welfare. 
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negative or positive, although concern typically centers upon shocks related to harmful 
events. 
The World Bank (2000) started to acknowledge the importance of vulnerability. It has 
encouraged the development and use of Risk and Vulnerability Assessments, which are 
intended to understand the source of risk, identify the most vulnerable, and design 
instruments to increase social protection. The vulnerability issue has become an area of 
active research. Measuring vulnerability, however, is especially difficult: because the 
concept is dynamic, it can be measured only with household panel data. Furthermore, 
many indicators of vulnerability have been proposed over the years, but there is a growing 
consensus that it is neither feasible nor desirable to capture vulnerability in a single 
indicator (World Bank, 2000). 
 
1-3. Poverty and Inequality Measures 
1-3-1. Inequality Measures5 
Gini Coefficient and Lorenz Curve 
Inequality specifically relates to the distribution of attributes, such as income or 
consumption, across the population. The most widely used single measure of inequality is 
the Gini coefficient, which is based on the Lorenz curve, a cumulative frequency curve that 
compares distribution. The Lorenz curve consists of the cumulative percentage of 
households (from poor to rich) on the horizontal axis and the cumulative percentage of per 
capita expenditure (or income) on the vertical axis, as shown in Figure 1-1. The diagonal 
line represents perfect equality. The graph shows how inequally (equally) distributed the 
income or expenditure becomes as the curve gets farther from (closer to) the 45 degree 
diagonal line. 
The Gini coefficient is defined as A / (A + B), where A and B are the areas portrayed in 
                                                 
5
 An explanation of this section mainly relies on Haughton and Khandker (2009). 
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Figure 1-1. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect equality when A = 0) to 1 (perfect 
inequality when B = 0), and can also be calculated in terms of the covariance between 
income (or expenditure) ܿ� and their ranks ܨሺܿ�ሻ: ܩ = ଶఓ ܿ݋�ሺܿ�, ܨሺܿ�ሻሻ ,    (1.1) 
 
 
 
Generalized Entropy Measures 
The Gini coefficient is the most widely used inequality index. Its major shortcoming, 
however, is that it cannot be decomposed. Shorrocks (1980) has shown that the only 
relative inequality measures which satisfy additive decomposability are generalized 
entropy measures. Their general formula is given as ܩ�ሺ∝ሻ = ଵ∝ሺ∝−ଵሻ [ଵ௡∑ ቀ���̅ቁ∝ − ͳ௡�=ଵ ],    (1.2) 
where ܿ̅ is the mean income (expenditure) per person. The values of GE measures vary 
Figure 1-1. Lorenz Curve 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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between zero and infinity, with zero representing an equal distribution and higher values 
representing higher levels of inequality. The parameter ∝ in the GE class represents the 
weight given to distances between incomes at different parts of the income distribution. It 
can take any real value. For lower values of ∝, GE is more sensitive to changes in the 
lower tail of the distribution. For higher values, GE is more sensitive to changes that affect 
the upper tail. The most common values of ∝ used are 0, 1, and 2. GE(1) is Theil’s T 
index, which might be written as ܩ�ሺͳሻ = ଵ௡∑ ���̅ ln ቀ���̅ቁ௡�=ଵ  ,    (1.3) 
In fact, GE(0), also known as Theil’s L, and sometimes designated as the mean 
logarithmic deviation, is given as shown below. ܩ�ሺͲሻ = ଵ௡∑ ln ቀ �̅��ቁ௡�=ଵ       (1.4) 
The generalized entropy measures can be decomposed across subsamples: inequalities 
between groups and within groups, such as regions, households and personal 
characteristics (education, gender and occupation), as well as geographical location (urban 
or rural). 
To decompose Theil’s T index, letting C be the total income of all � individuals of the 
sample, and ܿ̅ = ܥ �⁄  be mean income, then ܥ௝ is the total income of a subgroup with �௝  
members, and ܿ௝̅ = ܥ௝ �௝⁄  is the subgroup’s mean income. Actually, T represents GE(1) as � = ∑ ��௡�̅ ln ቀ௡��௡�̅ቁ௡�=ଵ = ∑ ��� ln ቀ௡��� ቁ௡�=ଵ = ∑ ቀ�ೕ� ቁ �௝௝ + ∑ �ೕ� ln (�ೕ �⁄௡ೕ ௡⁄ )௝  ,  (1.5) 
where �௝ represents the value of GE(1) for subgroup j. The first equation component 
represents within-group inequality. The second term measures between-group inequality. 
A similar decomposition is possible for GE(0), or Theil’s L, given as shown below. 
� = ∑ ଵ௡ ln ቀ �̅��ቁ௡�=ଵ = ∑ ቀ௡ೕ௡ ቁ �௝௝ + ∑ ௡ೕ௡ ln ( �̅�ೕ̅)௝  ,   (1.6) 
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Atkinson’s Inequality Measures 
Atkinson (1970) proposed another class of inequality measures. This class also has a 
weighting parameter ε, which measures aversion to inequality. Atkinson’s measures are 
defined as presented below. 
ܣ� = ͳ − [ͳ�∑ ቀܿ�̅ܿቁଵ−�௡�=ଵ ] ଵଵ−�  ,      ε ≠ ͳ, ܣ� = ͳ − ∏ (��ሺ1 �⁄ ሻ)��=1 �̅  ,      ε = ͳ ,    (1.7) 
 
1-3-2. Poverty Measures6 
FGT Measures 
Given information related to a welfare measure such as per-capita consumption 
(income), and a poverty line, the next issue is choosing an appropriate measure of 
aggregate poverty. Numerous studies of poverty measures have been published and many 
measures have been proposed (Kurosaki, 2009). The most widely used measure is the 
headcount ratio, which simply measures the proportion of the population that is counted as 
poor: �଴ = �௡ ,      (1.8) 
where ݍ denotes the number of poor people and � is the total population (or sample). 
The poverty headcount ratio represents the poverty incidence. The greatest virtue of the 
headcount index is that it is simple to construct and easy to understand. However, the 
measure presents some weaknesses. First, the headcount index does not incorporate 
consideration of the intensity of poverty. The index cannot reflect any transfers from a 
richer to a poorer person, which should improve the overall poverty in terms of welfare, 
unless the poor person moves above the poverty line, and vice versa. Moreover, the 
headcount index does not reflect how the poor people are, and therefore does not change if 
                                                 
6
 The explanation of this section relies mainly on Haughton and Khandker (2009). 
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people below the poverty line become poorer, or vice versa7. 
A moderately popular measure of poverty is the poverty gap ratio, which adds up the 
extent to which individuals on average fall below the poverty line, and expresses it as a 
percentage of the poverty line. The poverty gap ratio is defined as �ଵ = ଵ௡∑ ቀͳ − ���� ቁ��=ଵ ,    (1.9) 
where ݍ represents the number of individuals � whose consumption at time �, denoted 
by ܿ��, is below a certain level of poverty line �. In addition, � represents the total 
population. 
The poverty gap ratio represents the depth of poverty. This measure is the mean 
proportionate poverty gap in the population (where nonpoor people have a zero poverty 
gap). One might find it helpful to regard this measure as the minimum cost of eliminating 
poverty (relative to the poverty line) because it shows how much would have to be 
transferred to poor people to bring their incomes or expenditures up to the poverty line. 
The weakness of this measure, however, is that it reflects no transfers among poor people 
(transfers made among people below the poverty line). 
To construct a measure of poverty that incorporates inequality among poor people, some 
researchers use the squared poverty gap ratio. �ଶ = ଵ௡∑ ቀͳ − ���� ቁଶ��=ଵ  ,    (1.10) 
This ratio is simply a weighted sum of poverty gaps (as a proportion of the poverty line), 
where the weights are the proportionate poverty gaps themselves. By squaring the poverty 
gap ratio, the measure implicitly assigns more weight to observations that fall well below 
the poverty line. The squared poverty gap ratio is referred to represent the severity of 
poverty. The measure, however, lacks intuitive appeal or concrete meaning. Therefore, it is 
not easy to interpret, in contrast to the poverty headcount ratio or the poverty gap ratio. 
                                                 
7
 In this sense, the easiest means to reduce the headcount index is to target benefits to 
people who are only slightly below the poverty line because they are the “cheapest” to 
move across the line (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). 
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The three measures described above are generally written in a common equation known 
as the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) indices proposed by Foster et al. (1984). �∝ = ଵ௡∑ ቀͳ − ���� ቁ∝��=ଵ  ,     (1.11) 
In that equation, ݍ  represents the number of individuals, identified by � , whose 
consumption at time �, denoted by ܿ��, is below a certain poverty line �. In addition, � 
represents the total population. When ∝= Ͳ, ͳ, or 2, �଴, �ଵ, and �ଶ respectively represent 
the Poverty head count ratio, the Poverty gap ratio, and the Squared poverty gap ratio. 
 
Sen Index and SST Index 
Sen (1976) proposed an index that is intended to combine the effects of the number of 
poor people, the depth of their poverty, and the distribution of poverty within the group. 
The index is given as �ௌ = �଴ [ͳ − ሺͳ − ܩ�ሻ ఓ�� ] ,   (1.12) 
where �଴ represents the headcount ratio, ߤ� stands for the mean income (or expenditure) 
of poor people, and ܩ� is the Gini coefficient of inequality among the poor. The measure 
can also be written as the average of the headcount (�଴) and poverty gap (�ଵ) ratios, 
weighted by the Gini coefficient of the poor as shown below. �ௌ = �଴ܩ� + �ଵሺͳ − ܩ�ሻ ,   (1.13) 
The Sen index, which has been widely discussed, has the benefit of incorporating the 
income distribution among poor people. However, the index is almost never used outside 
of the academic literature, perhaps because it lacks the intuitive appeal of some simpler 
measures of poverty, but perhaps also because it cannot be used to decompose poverty into 
contributions from different subgroups. In this sense, the squared poverty gap ratio has 
virtually replaced the Sen index as a similar poverty measure that can capture the income 
distribution among poor people. 
A modified version of the Sen index is the Sen–Shorrocks–Thon (SST) index, proposed 
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by Shorrocks (1995), defined as �ௌௌ் = �଴�ଵ�(ͳ + ̂ܩ�) ,    (1.14) 
which is the product of the headcount ratio, the poverty gap ratio (applied to poor people 
only) and a term with the Gini coefficient of the poverty gap ratios for the whole 
population8. The SST index uses weights with the entire population as a reference group, 
rather than the subset of poor persons, which means that, when someone crosses the 
poverty line, the rankings do not change discontinuously. The strong transfer condition is 
satisfied. 
The measure can be decomposed and can provide a good sense of the sources of change 
in poverty over time. ∆ ln �ௌௌ் = ∆ ln �଴ + ∆ ln �ଵ� + ∆ ln(ͳ + ̂ܩ�) ,  (1.15) 
The decomposition shows the degree of contributions of these three factors: the percentage 
change in headcount ratio (if there are more poor people), the percentage change in poverty 
gap ratio among the poor (if the poor get poorer), and the percentage change in the Gini 
coefficient among the poor (if there is greater inequality among the poor). 
 
Clark–Watts Index9 
Another group of poverty measures was proposed by Clark et al. (1981) with the 
general form of 
�� = ଵ௡∑ ଵ� {ͳ − ቀ���� ቁ�}��=ଵ  ,   � ൑ ͳ,   (1.16) 
where ݍ represents the number of individuals, identified by �, whose consumption at time 
                                                 
8
 The SST index is also written as the following by letting � = ሺ�ଵ, �ଶ, ⋯ , �௡ሻ denote the 
distribution of normalized poverty gaps as �ௌௌ் = ߤ�ሺͳ + ܩ�ሻ,      �� ≡ ݉�� {� − ܿ�� , Ͳ} , 
where ߤ�  and ܩ�  respectively denote the mean and the Gini coefficient for the 
distribution � (Shorrocks, 1995). 
9
 The explanation of the Clark–Watts index is based on Kurosaki (2006b) and Kurosaki 
(2009).  
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�, denoted by ܿ��, is below a certain poverty line �. In addition, � represents the total 
population. This group, known as Clark–Watts poverty measure, includes the poverty gap 
index (when  � = ͳ) and Watts’ index (� = Ͳ) as special cases (�� = ͳ �⁄ ∑ ሺln � −��=ଵln ܿ��ሻ). As ͳ −  �  becomes more positive (�  itself can be negative), the degree of 
sensitivity to the inequality among poor people is expected to be stronger10. The measure 
does not respond to inequality among poor people at all when � = ͳ. 
The measure is used increasingly by researchers because it satisfies all theoretical 
properties that one might want in a poverty index. Ravallion and Chen (2001) argue that 
three axioms are necessary for any good measure of poverty11. Under the focus axiom, the 
measure should not vary if the non-poor income varies. Under the monotonicity axiom, any 
income gain for poor people should reduce poverty. Under the transfer axiom, 
inequality-reducing transfers among poor people should reduce poverty (cited from 
Haughton and Khandker, 2009). 
 
1-3-3. Dynamic Poverty Analysis using Panel Data12 
It is often necessary to measure how poverty changes over time to monitor and evaluate 
the effects of specific shocks, policies, and projects on poverty. Changes in poverty rates 
are typically based on comparisons of cross-sectional data. In some cases, however, it is 
possible to collect panel data for which the same household (or individual) is surveyed at 
two or more points in time. Panel surveys have some important advantages. It is only with 
                                                 
10
 Kurosaki (2009) argues that the merit of the Clark–Watts index is that it is highly 
consistent with the microeconomic theory on consumption smoothing. When � < ͳ, the 
function becomes strictly convex so that it has a property that risk always increases 
transient poverty. Clark–Watts poverty index are associated with constant relative risk 
aversion where Arrow–Pratt’s coefficient of relative risk aversion equals ͳ − �. Therefore, 
risk aversion (� < ͳ) also implies prudence (Kurosaki, 2006b).  
11
 Kurosaki (2009) insists that the measure should be used more widely because of its 
virtue of high consistency for microeconomic theory on consumption smoothing. 
12
 The arguments of this section are based mainly on Haughton and Khandker (2009) and 
Kurosaki (2009). 
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panel data that one can measure who moves into and out of poverty over time. 
Some households are persistently poor, whereas others move into and out of poverty 
from year to year. An extremely valuable application of panel data is identification of who 
falls into each different category of poverty. It is common to distinguish four categories13: 
Chronically poor people have average consumption per capita over time (ܿ̅) that is at or 
below the poverty line (z). Clearly a priority in such cases is to help raise average 
consumption levels above the poverty line. 
The second category is that of persistently poor people, who, among chronically poor 
people, never emerge from poverty, not even for a year or two. In this respect, they might 
be distinguished from those chronically poor people who have an occasional good year 
when they escape from poverty for a while. The third one is transient poor people, who are 
poor from time to time, but who are not poor on average. With better smoothing of their 
consumption stream they could, in principle, avoid all spells of poverty. The fourth one is 
never poor people or always nonpoor people, who do not drop into poverty even 
occasionally, at least in the time frame under study. 
The transition matrix is an example to show the effects of the movement of households 
(or individuals) into and out of poverty over time. Table 1-1 shows the transition matrix of 
a series of rural household panel data from seven Mexican states called Encuestas de 
Evaluación de los Hogares (ENCEL). The poverty line here is determined arbitrarily as 50 
percent of the Mexican rural food basket. 
According to categories proposed by Kurosaki (2009), the table shows that always poor 
households account for 56 percent and transitory poor households account for 30 percent 
(0.11 plus 0.19), whereas always nonpoor households are only 14 percent. The poverty 
headcount ratio worsened from 67 percent to 75 percent in this period. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that the existence of transient poor people cannot be ignored and that 
                                                 
13
 Kurosaki (2009), instead, uses three categories: “always poor,” “transient poverty,” and 
“always nonpoor.” 
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impoverished households amount to 19 percent, although the total poverty rate rose by 12 
percent points. These facts can be traced only by application of the dynamic poverty 
approach using panel data. 
 
 
 
Decomposition of Poverty Measures14 
Ravallion (1988) proposed a decomposition of poverty measures into transient and 
chronic factors using household panel data. Let ܿ�� represent the consumption level of 
individual i in time t, and ��  an economy’s cross-sectional mean of an individual’s 
poverty measure ݌��. Any poverty measure is expected to be neutral with a given poverty 
line z. Consequently, the poverty score function is defined as ݌�� = ݌ሺ���ሻ , where ��� ≡ ܿ�� �⁄ . The function ݌ሺ∙ሻ  becomes ݌ሺ���ሻ = Ͳ  when ��� ൒ ͳ  (not poor), and 
becomes ݌ሺ���ሻ > Ͳ and ߲݌ሺ���ሻ ߲⁄ ��� ൑ Ͳ when ��� < ͳ (poor). If ܿ��  is stochastic, 
then the expected value of ��, ���, can be decomposed into chronic poverty and transient 
poverty. 
 
                                                 
14
 Equation formats are based on Kurosaki (2009). 
poor not poor
poor 0.56 0.11 0.67
not poor 0.19 0.14 0.33
Total (2007) 0.75 0.25 1.00
Notes:
2) The consumption level is deflated by average annual food CPI. 
3) Sample size: 18,924 households
Source: Author's calculation based on ENCEL 2003, 2007. 
(percentage of population)
Table 1-1. Transition Matrix of per capita Real Food
Consumption in Rural Mexico, 2003-2007
1) Poverty line: 50 percent of the rural food basket (23 Mexican pesos per capita per
day as of June, 2011)
Total (2003)2003 2007
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Overall Poverty: ��� ≡ � [ଵ௡∑ ݌��௡�=ଵ ] = ଵ௡∑ �[݌ሺ���ሻ]௡�=ଵ        (1.17) 
Chronic Poverty: ��� ≡ ଵ௡∑ ݌ሺ�[���]ሻ௡�=ଵ         (1.18) 
Transient Poverty: ��் ≡ ��� − ��� = ଵ௡∑ {�[݌ሺ���ሻ] − ݌ሺ�[���]ሻ}௡�=ଵ       (1.19) 
 
If ݌ሺ���ሻ is strictly convex with ���  in the case of ��� < ͳ, then consumption risks 
always increase transient poverty (if ∝> ͳ in FGT measures, and β < ͳ in the Clark–
Watts index) (Kurosaki, 2009). 
Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposed poverty measures into growth and redistribution 
components15. ܨ�ሺܿ��ሻ represents an economy’s cumulative distribution function of the 
individual consumption (ܿ�� ) at time t. Actually, the mean consumption ߤ�  and a 
parameterized Lorenz curve ��  can be calculated from ܨ�ሺܿ��ሻ. Once ߤ� , ��  and a 
poverty line z are given, any poverty measure explained above can be calculated as �� = �ሺ�, ߤ�, ��ሻ. Then the change in �� is decomposed as follows. 
      ��+ଵ − �� = �ሺ�, ߤ�+ଵ, ��+ଵሻ − �ሺ�, ߤ�, ��ሻ = {�ሺ�, ߤ�+ଵ, ��ሻ − �ሺ�, ߤ�, ��ሻ} + {�ሺ�, ߤ�, ��+ଵሻ − �ሺ�, ߤ�, ��ሻ}+ [{�ሺ�, ߤ�+ଵ, ��+ଵሻ − �ሺ�, ߤ�, ��+ଵሻ} −{�ሺ�, ߤ�+ଵ, ��ሻ − �ሺ�, ߤ�, ��ሻ}] ,   (1.20) 
The equation’s first term is interpreted as the growth component. The second term 
represents the redistribution component. The third term is a residual. 
 
1-4. Poverty Profile and Determinants of Poverty16 
A poverty profile sets out major facts on poverty (and also inequality). Then we 
examine the patterns of poverty to ascertain how it varies by geography (by region, urban 
or rural, and so on), by community characteristics (e.g., infrastructure and access to public 
                                                 
15
 The equation formats of this decomposition are based on those of Kurosaki (2009). 
16
 Discussions of this section are based mainly on Haughton and Khandker (2009) and 
Kurosaki (2009). 
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goods and services such as schools and clinics), and by household or individual 
characteristics (education, household size, assets, sex, age, employment, and so on). 
Therefore, a poverty profile is a comprehensive poverty comparison presenting the degree 
to which and the manner in which poverty varies across subgroups of society. A 
well-presented poverty profile can be extremely informative and useful for assessing how 
the sectoral or regional pattern of economic change is likely to affect aggregate poverty. It 
typically uses basic techniques such as tables and graphs, but it can also be estimated using 
decomposition methods of the poverty and inequality measures discussed above. 
A poverty profile describes the pattern of poverty well, but is not principally intended to 
shed any light on its causes. A satisfactory explanation of why some people are poor is 
necessary so that one might tackle the roots of poverty. In this respect, regression analyses 
are commonly undertaken to identify the effects of each characteristic described above on 
income (or consumption) per capita. A regression estimate shows how closely each 
independent variable is related to the dependent variable (consumption or income per 
capita), controlling for all other variables. 
Two types of poverty regression analysis can be used. The first method is to explain the 
level of expenditure (or income) per capita—the dependent variable—as a function of 
different variables—the independent variables. In this case, the independent variables are 
typically those characteristics discussed above: geographic, communal and household or 
individual-specific variables. ln ��� =  �ܾ + �� ,     (1.21) 
Therein, ܿ� represents the household consumption or income per capita, z stands for the 
poverty line,  � is a vector of independent variables, b is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and �� represents an error term. The dependent variable, lnሺܿ� �⁄ ሻ, can be 
replaced by ln ܿ� or ܿ�. 
The other method is to explain whether a household is poor using a probit (or logit) 
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regression. In this case, the dependent variable is expected to be binary, usually taking a 
value of 1 if the household is poor and 0 otherwise. For example, the probit model is �ݎ݋ܾሺܪ�ሻ = Φሺ �ܾሻ,    (1.22) 
where ܪ�  represents an binary variable such as headcount ratio that takes 1 if the 
household i is poor and 0 otherwise. 
According to Kurosaki (2009), one should restrict the use of the probit or logit model to 
the case in which the consumption or income data do not exist. Therefore, whether the 
household is poor or not is the only information available. He argues that poverty 
regressions using poverty measures are econometrically inefficient because the poverty 
measures are those derived from each household’s consumption or income per se. 
Consequently, it is sufficient to calculate the ex-post probability for a household to be 
below the poverty line using the fitted value obtained from Equation (1.21) as shown 
below. �ݎ݋ܾሺܪ� = ͳሻ = �ݎ݋ܾሺ �ܾ + �� < ͳሻ,   (1.23) 
In addition to consumption or income regression, there is scope for a wide variety of 
regressions: measures related to capabilities such as child nutrition and schooling, 
determinants of employment or labor income, and estimations of agricultural production 
functions. 
 
1-5. Pro-Poor Growth 
Sala-i-Martin (2006) estimated the World Distribution of Income (WDI) by integrating 
individual income distributions for 138 countries between 1970 and 2000. His estimations 
of poverty and income inequality based on WDI demonstrated that poverty rates in 2000 
were between one-third and one-half of what they were in 1970 for all four different lines. 
He also estimated eight indexes of income inequality implied by WDI, concluding that all 
of them show reductions in global inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. He also 
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confirmed that this poverty reduction and income convergence are attributed to the 
dramatic growth rates of China, India, and the remaining Asian countries from the 1970s, 
which offset the increasing poverty ratio and divergent incomes of African countries. He 
argues, therefore, that unless the incomes of these African citizens start growing rapidly, 
world income inequality will start rising again. 
Although few economists doubt that economic growth is necessary for the long-term 
reduction of poverty, disputes have arisen related to the link between the two factors. If the 
incomes of poor people rise closely in line with incomes overall, the key to poverty 
reduction is rapid economic growth. However, if the relationship is weak, other policies 
such as targeted subsidies are likely to be important and the concept of pro-poor growth 
has greater relevance (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) presented from their empirical results obtained with a sample 
of 92 countries spanning four decades that average incomes of the poorest fifth of a 
country on average rise or fall at the same rate as the country’s average incomes do. 
Additionally, they argued that their study was unable to relate the changes in the income 
distributions across countries and over time to average incomes (economic growth), or to 
any of the various proxies for policies and institutions that matter for growth and poverty 
reduction. Consequently, they concluded that growth, on average, does benefit poor people 
as much as anyone else in society, and that standard growth-enhancing policies should be 
at the center of any effective poverty-reduction strategy. 
Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposed changes in poverty measures into growth (in 
average income) and redistribution (of income) components, applying the methodology to 
the cases of Brazil and India in the 1980s. They showed that redistribution alleviated 
poverty in India, although growth was quantitatively more important. In contrast, 
worsening distribution in Brazil, associated with the macroeconomic shocks of the 1980s, 
mitigated poverty alleviation through the limited growth that occurred. The World Bank 
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(2000) applied the methodology of Datt and Ravallion (1992) to various countries and 
concluded that even if the growth effects dominate in the medium term, distributional 
considerations play a non-negligible role. 
Kakwani et al. (2004) proposed a definition of relative pro-poor growth, insisting that a 
measure of pro-poor growth should incorporate not only reduction in poverty but also 
improvement in inequality. They argued that the term pro-poor means that poor people 
should receive more but not fewer benefits than nonpoor people, criticizing that the 
absolute concepts of pro-poor growth of the World Bank and others, which regard growth 
to be pro-poor if it reduces poverty. 
With respect to the relation between growth, inequality, and poverty reduction, the 
World Bank (2000) presents the point that even when the distribution of income itself does 
not change with growth, countries with similar rates of growth can have markedly different 
poverty outcomes depending on the initial inequality. Ravallion (2004) also confirms that 
initial inequalities in a number of dimensions, not just incomes, and how they evolve 
overtime can be crucial to the extent of poverty reduction, insisting that they can affect 
both the extent of growth and how its benefits are shared. He referred to the rapid 
economic growth and poverty reduction in China during the 1980s and 1990s concluding 
that the pace of poverty reduction would have been even higher if not for the steep rise in 
income inequality. In other words, growth was definitely pro-poor in China, but rising 
inequality made it less so. 
In addition, a recent study conducted by Ravallion (2012) using household survey data 
for 90 developing and transient countries with more than two periods revealed a lack of 
poverty convergence despite the existence of mean consumption convergence. It also 
revealed that growth generally reduces poverty. The findings of Ravallion (2012) point to 
three distinct consequences of being a poor country for subsequent progress against 
poverty. The usual neoclassical convergence effect is the inference that countries starting 
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with a lower mean consumption, thereby usually having a higher poverty rate, grow faster 
and therefore enjoy faster poverty reduction than otherwise similar countries. 
Countervailing against this pattern is an adverse direct effect of poverty on growth, such 
that countries with a higher initial incidence of poverty tend to experience a lower rate of 
growth, controlling for the initial mean consumption. Additionally, a high poverty rate 
makes it harder to achieve any given proportionate impact on poverty through growth in 
the country’s mean consumption. 
 
1-6. Economic and Poverty Outlook of Latin America and the Caribbean 
1-6-1. Overview 
According to World Bank (2013), the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) grew 3 percent in 2012. Growth is expected to remain robust, at 
3.5 percent, as strong as domestic demand compensates for weak global economic 
conditions. Especially during the 2000s, LAC countries enjoyed steady growth after the 
so-called “lost decade” of the 1980s and economic instability with repeated financial crises 
in the 1990s. In this respect, the OECD (2010) acknowledged that the 2009 global 
economic crisis affected LAC economies severely, but several economies in the region 
displayed noteworthy resilience, reversing the downturn fairly quickly despite LACs’ high 
level of integration with international markets and their poor or negative growth reported 
in 200917. However, the report by the OECD et al. (2013) warns that LAC is currently 
experiencing a slowdown in growth attributable to the downturn in external demand and 
the structural limitations of its economies. 
The steady economic growth and sound economic policies improved the lives of 
millions of people in the region over the past decade, with more than 70 million people 
                                                 
17
 OECD (2010) reports that major external factors contributing to this good performance 
in LAC were Chinese demand for commodities and timely monetary action of the 
international community. 
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lifted out of poverty and 50 million joining the ranks of the middle class during 2003–2011. 
For the first time ever, the number of people belonging to the middle class surpassed the 
number of poor people, a sign that LAC countries are progressing toward becoming 
components of a middle-class region. Despite the impressive gains of the past decade, the 
region remains unequal, with some 82 million people living on less than $2.5 per day. 
Creating opportunities for vulnerable people is the priority issue to be addressed (World 
Bank, 2013). Galiani (2007) also insists that the elimination of poverty continues to be a 
main challenge facing the region and remains at the top of its policy agenda. 
According to Global Monitoring Report 201318, Latin America and the Caribbean region 
performance in attaining the 9 out of 21 MDG targets is impressive. Nevertheless, like 
most other regions, it is also lagging significantly in terms of maternal health and access to 
sanitation-related MDGs. At the country level, the region’s starting position was already 
close to the MDG goals. However, it continues to lag in terms of MDGs related to health 
and sanitation. No country has achieved a maternal health related MDG. Only 14 countries 
have achieved the MDGs related with access to safe water, and 10 countries with access to 
sanitation. This performance is attributable mostly to slow progress during the last few 
years. Moreover, only 14 Latin American countries have either met or made sufficient 
progress to achieve MDGs related with extreme poverty reduction. Only 18 have achieved 
gender parity in terms of primary education. 
Among the 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti and Mexico—two 
countries treated as case studies in this dissertation—should provide us a remarkable 
contrast in discussing not only economic, but also poverty-related issues in the region. 
 
                                                 
18
 Global Monitoring Report 2013: Regional Brief 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1327948020811/8
401693-1355753354515/8980448-1366122085455/LAC_RegionalBrief_GMR2013_Eng.p
df (Accessed on Dec. 1, 2013) 
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1-6-2. Economic and Poverty Outlook of Haiti and Mexico 
Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and, as one of 
the world’s poorest countries, its Gross Domestic Products (GDP) per capita was US$734 
in 2011 (ECLAC, 2012) and its Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.532 (UNDP, 
2013), ranked 161st among 187 countries in 2012. Its population was about 10.1 million in 
2012 (ECLAC, 2012), making it the most densely populated country in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
In contrast, Mexico is the second largest country in LAC in terms of population as well 
as economy size after Brazil. Its GDP per capita amounted to US$10,130 in 2011 (ECLAC, 
2012) and its HDI was 0.775 (UNDP, 2013), ranked 61st among 187 countries in 2012. Its 
population is about 114.8 million in 2012 (ECLAC, 2012). In contrast to Haiti, Mexico, 
being an OECD member, is regarded as an upper middle income country of the world and 
a leading country among Latin American and Caribbean nations. 
The Haitian economy fell into a negative trend after a coup in 1991, which was followed 
by political instability and an embargo period. In 2004, further political turmoil occurred 
when then-President Aristide went into forced exile. Since President Preval was elected in 
2006 with the active intervention of the international community, the economic and social 
situation has been improving. Although economic growth had resumed from 2004, the 
country was again shocked in every way by a devastating earthquake in 2010. 
Consequently, Haiti has still not recovered to the level of GDP per capita that it had in 
1990, as shown in Figure 1-2. 
Mexico undertook neoliberal economic and political reforms19 after its debt crisis in 
1982, in line with the conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank. The series of reforms 
concluded with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into force 
                                                 
19
 The neoliberal reforms in Mexico consisted of macroeconomic stabilization, trade 
liberalization, capital and financial liberalization, privatization, deregulation, tax reform, 
reduction in public expenditures, and so on (Uchiyama, 2007). 
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in 1994. NAFTA is well known as the very first free trade agreement (FTA) involving 
developed countries (United States and Canada) and a developing country (Mexico). 
Mexico’s drastic policy reforms from import substitution (ISI) in the 1970s drew special 
attention worldwide as an ambitious experiment of neoliberalism20. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 With respect to trade liberalization in Mexico, the (weighted) average tariff rates 
decreased from 23.5 percent in 1985 to 12.5 percent in 1990. The coverage of import 
licenses dropped from 92.2 percent to 19.9 percent in 1990 (Feliciano, 2001). Furthermore, 
all tariffs on imports from the NAFTA member countries, except for a small part of 
“sensitive” agricultural products, were abolished instantaneously when NAFTA came into 
force (Hamaguchi and Nishijima, 2007). 
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The economic growth recovered around 1990 in Mexico after its “lost decade” in the 
1980s triggered by the debt crisis, but it was hit by a financial crisis called the “Tequila 
Shock” at the end of 1994, which brought negative growth of -6.2 percent in 1995. Since 
then, the Mexican economy seemed to have fully recovered and enjoyed a stable growth 
period in the 2000s until the Lehman Shock in 2008. Mexico posted negative GDP growth 
of as much as -6.0 percent in 2009, which was much greater than the LAC average (-1.9 
percent), which indicates clearly that the Mexican economy is closely linked to the US 
economy. 
 
 
 
When looking at the domestic economic structures in Table 1-2, it is notable that the 
Haitian economy remains agriculture-dominated and that the industry sector (especially the 
manufacturing sector) is too small and underdeveloped. The agricultural sector accounts 
for as much as 27.3 percent of GDP and more than half of the employment in 1999 in Haiti, 
whereas it accounts for only 4.7 percent of GDP and 20.5 percent of employment, 
respectively, during the same period in Mexico. Mexico reduced the share of the 
1999 2010 1999 2010
Value Added (% of GDP) Agriculture 27.3 25.0 4.7 3.9
Industry 15.1 16.4 28.7 34.7
Manufacturing 7.6 6.9 21.0 18.1
Services 50.1 51.7 66.6 61.4
Employment (%) Agriculture 50.6  - 20.5 13.1
Industry 10.7  - 25.4 25.5
Services 38.7  - 53.6 60.6
Source: Author's calculation based on World Development Indicators 2013.
Table 1-2. Sector Production and Employment
Haiti Mexico
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agricultural sector both in GDP and in employment in 2010 (especially, employment 
decreased from 20.5 percent to 13.1 percent), but the situation is apparently almost 
unchanged in Haiti although employment data in 2010 are unavailable. Mexico has 
expanded the industrial sector in terms of GDP and ex-farmers were absorbed into the 
service sector during 1999–2010, whereas the GDP contributions of the industry and 
manufacturing sectors remained almost unchanged in Haiti during that period. 
As discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2, the Living Conditions Survey in Haiti in 2001 
shows that nearly 80 percent of the population subsists below the poverty line. About 30 
percent of the main household providers are unemployed or inactive. In addition, the 
opportunities for wage employment are extremely limited (only 10 percent of main 
household providers are engaged in it). Furthermore, it is estimated that 70–80 percent of 
the labor force is involved in the informal sector in Haiti (Jadotte, 2004). 
With respect to the external sectors, Figure 1-5 shows that Haiti’s external balance is 
extremely negative: imports exceed exports to a great degree. The trade deficit has been 
growing since the 1990s, which indicates not only that Haiti has failed to develop export 
industries, but also that its domestic industries are virtually non-existent. Figure 1-7 shows 
that there had been virtually no foreign direct investment (FDI) during the embargo period, 
after the 1991 coup, which ended in 2004. It is noteworthy that the FDI inflows were even 
negative in Haiti in 1992–1994, although Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole 
experienced a FDI booming period in the 1990s, including Mexico. 
Mexico almost always has a trade deficit, as do most Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. However, as Figure 1-6 shows, Mexico drastically increased its trade volume 
(both exports and imports) since the 1990s, in line with the neoliberal reform process. The 
trade grew even more in the 2000s until the Lehman Shock in 2008, except for a couple of 
years of stagnation in the early 2000s attributable to recession in the United States21. 
                                                 
21
 Mexico’s largest trade partner, both in exports and imports, is the United States. The 
second largest partners were the European Union in the 1980s and 1990s, but Asia replaced 
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Figure 1-4 shows that Latin American trade growth was slower in the 1990s (especially 
compared to that of Mexico), but it accelerated in the 2000s mainly because of the 
commodity boom. 
Many households in Latin American and the Caribbean rely on foreign remittances from 
family members and relatives. Haiti and Mexico are no exceptions. Figure 1-8 shows, 
however, how heavily the Haitian economy depends on remittances. Amuedo-Dorantes et 
al. (2010) reported that workers’ remittances as a share of GDP increased from 5 percent in 
1996 to more than 20 percent in the 2000s. In addition, data from the Living Conditions 
Survey in Haiti (ECVH, 2001) show that a quarter of all households with main providers 
are aged 15–65 receive remittances. Consequently, consumption levels have been 
maintained by remittances, which have increased continually since the mid-1990s, in 
response to the decline of GDP per capita because of political and economic turmoil 
(World Bank, 2006), a phenomenon that is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
the EU as the second largest import partner after the 2000s. The import share from Asia is 
growing rapidly in the 2000s (Uchiyama, 2007). 
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Table 1-3 presents a comparison of major demographic and social development 
indicators of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Haiti, and Mexico. The data show 
that Haiti is far below the LAC average in any indicator, whereas Mexico ranks over the 
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LAC average. Specifically, Haiti is well behind in human development that is expected to 
be related to poverty: life expectancy at birth only 62.1 years (vs. 74.7 in LAC and 76.5 in 
Mexico); the infant mortality rate is quite high at 43.6 per thousand (vs. 18.9 in LAC and 
13.7 in Mexico); the adult literacy rate is 48.7 percent (vs. 91.4 percent in LAC and 
improvement from 91.6 percent in 2005 to 93.1 percent in 2010 in Mexico); and the HDI is 
among the world’s worst. 
 
 
LAC a Haiti Mexico
2010 590,082 9,884 112,364
2010–2015 1.10 1.23 1.03
2010 78.80 45.30 78.00
74.70 62.10 76.50
2010–2015 18.90 43.60 13.70
2005 91.40 48.70 91.60
2010 91.40  - 93.10
2012  - 0.456 (161) 0.775 (61)
Notes:
a) LAC stands for Latin America and the Carribean.
Source: Author's elaboration based on CEPAL Anuario Estadístico 2012.
(World ranking among 187 countries in
parentheses)
b) UNDP International Human Development Indicators:
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html (accessed on Dic. 11, 2013)
INFANT MORTALITY RATE
(Per thousand live births)
LITERACY RATE  
(Percentage of the population aged 15
years and older)
 (Average annual rate per 100 inhabitants)
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX b
PERCENTAGE OF URBAN
POPULATION
(Percentage of total population)
2010–2015LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH
(Years, average)
TOTAL POPULATION GROWTH
RATE
Table 1-3. Demographic and Social Indicators
Year/Period
Country/Region
TOTAL POPULATION
 (Thousands of persons, at mid-year)
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Table 1-4 shows the Gini coefficients. Latin America and the Caribbean have the 
highest income inequality in the world (higher than Sub-Saharan Africa). Mexico’s 
inequality is higher than the regional average, but Haiti is the most unequal country in 
LAC, along with Brazil. 
 
 
 
Table 1-5 presents the poverty headcount ratio by different poverty lines of LAC, Haiti 
and Mexico. The high incidence of poverty in Haiti is readily apparent: about 62 percent of 
people subsist on less than 1.25 US dollars (PPP) per day (extremely poor) and about 78 
percent subsist on less than 2 US dollars (PPP) per day (poor). The table’s second row 
shows that as many as 88 percent of rural population are poor in Haiti. In contrast, only 3.9 
percent subsist on less than 1.25 US dollars (PPP) per day and 13.5 percent subsist on less 
than 2 US dollars (PPP) per day in Mexico. One should note, however, that Mexico’s 
poverty persists as a major development issue when applying different poverty lines. The 
poverty incidence rises to 54 percent (at the national level) when using the World Bank 
based country-specific poverty line, and to 33 percent in case of ECLAC based poverty 
0.59
0.50
0.49
0.47
0.32
Notes:
b) 2002 based on WDI 2013.
Source: WDI 2013 and Jadotte (2007).
c) Based on Jadotte (2007) Table 1 (originally from WDI
2001).
a) 2001 based on World Development Indicators (WDI)
2013.
Table 1-4. Gini Coefficients 
Sub-Saharan Africa c
South Asia c
LAC c
Mexico b
Haiti a
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line. In this sense, Mexico presents a good example of how the magnitude of poverty ratios 
is prone to fluctuate depending on which poverty line to use, as discussed in the previous 
section. Mexico’s poverty ratios are slightly lower than the LAC average in three 
dimensions. Still, rural poverty is also outstanding in Mexico. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-9 presents evolutions of poverty and inequality in Mexico after the 1990s22. 
The Gini coefficient has not changed much, but it has exhibited a decreasing trend. The 
poverty headcount ratios, as represented by 1.25 US dollars and 2 US dollars per day 
(international poverty lines), decreased greatly since the late 1990s mainly because of the 
stable economic growth of the period. The headcount ratio at the national poverty line was 
also in a decreasing trend along with the international poverty lines until 2006, but it 
reversed since then. Figure 1-10 shows poverty trends using the country-specific poverty 
line. It reveals that the national as well as rural and urban poverty ratios rose between 2006 
                                                 
22
 Haiti’s poverty-related indices are available only for 2001 in any of the World 
Development Indicators. 
LAC c Haiti Mexico
2002 2001 2002
 - 62 4
 - 78 13
 - 78 54
 - 88 69
 - 45 44
36  - 33
53  - 45
32  - 27
Notes:
a) Based on World Development Indicators (WDI) 2013.
c) LAC Estimate based on 19 countries
Rural poverty line
Urban poverty line
(ECLAC based) b
National poverty line
Rural poverty line
b) Percentage of households having incomes amounting to less than twice the cost of a basic food basket. Includes
indigent households.
Table 1-5. Poverty Headcount Ratio by Different Poverty Lines
 (% of population)
Source: WDI 2013 and CEPAL Anuario Estadistico (ECLAC Statistical.Yearbook) 2003.
Urban poverty line
 $1.25 a day (PPP) 
 $2 a day (PPP) 
(World Bank based country-specific) a
National poverty line
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and 2008. However, the rural poverty ratio remained unchanged in 2008–2010, although 
the national poverty ratio continued to rise in the same period because of worsening of the 
urban poverty ratio. The major factors of this poverty degradation are expected to be the 
Lehman Shock and the consequent economic recession and the food price crisis caused by 
the commodity boom that occurred during that period, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Causes of the recent poverty degradation in Mexico must be identified. One might say, 
however, that the recent poverty degradation caused by uncertain international economic 
situations strongly implies that Mexican people (specifically poor people) remain 
vulnerable to shocks and fall easily into a poverty trap, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
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1-7. Aims and Scopes of the Study 
This chapter presented overviews of concepts and measures of poverty, inequality, and 
vulnerability, with continued discussion of major poverty-related issues: poverty profiles 
and pro-poor growth. We specifically examined the macroeconomic and poverty outlook of 
Latin America, especially contrasting those of Mexico and Haiti. Based on the discussions 
presented in the chapter, we set the aims and scopes of the study. 
First, the chapter revealed that poverty and vulnerability persist as extremely important 
issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. That region, generally regarded as a middle 
income region with the recent stable growth and sound macroeconomic performances after 
the 2000s, is in reality a diverse region not only in political, historical, cultural, and 
climatic dimensions, but also in terms of the degree of economic development among its 
nations. One can readily observe that Haiti and Mexico are respectively situated at either 
end of the development spectrum in LAC. Mexico is a leading economy among LAC 
countries, making the most of globalization in its development process and implementing 
various poverty reduction policies that are now convergent to the CCT program. Despite 
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all these efforts, Mexico retains a high incidence of poverty and vulnerability. Haiti, in 
contrast, has been struggling with political turmoil and damage from natural disasters even 
into the 1990s and 2000s, which has isolated the country almost completely from the 
global world, although it receives humanitarian aid such as United Nations Stabilization 
Mission (MINUSTAH). In consequence, Haiti remains an extremely poor country among 
world nations, with extremely high incidence of poverty and inequality, where a large 
proportion of people have no choice but to engage in subsistence agriculture. 
Consequently, studying the cases of Haiti and Mexico will provide valuable insights to 
understand fundamental aspects of poverty and vulnerability in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and will enable us to draw many implications. Because Haiti and Mexico 
occupy each end of the development spectrum, the scopes and methods for their study are 
expected to be different. Considering the difficulties of Haiti discussed in the preceding 
sections—specifically the lack of economic activities other than subsistence agriculture, 
abundant rural labor force and extremely low level of human capitals––the creation of 
sufficient job opportunities in non-agricultural sectors is urgently necessary to reduce 
poverty in Haiti. From this perspective, Chapter 2 presents discussion of poverty in Haiti 
with emphasis on employment issues. 
In Mexico, an upper middle income country with a highly globalized and industrialized 
economy among LAC nations and indeed among world nations, poverty has maintained a 
decreasing trend in the recent decade, even though its incidence remains high as a result of 
macroeconomic stability and stable growth during the period until 2008. Nevertheless, that 
favorable trend has reversed with the global recession caused by the Lehman Shock. Rising 
international commodity prices have also directly and adversely affected poor households. 
This fact implies that poor Mexicans are actually highly vulnerable to shocks, and that 
global shocks immediately influence poor people. Considering these facts, Chapters 3 and 
4 present analyses of rural household vulnerability in Mexico, particularly addressing the 
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impacts of rising international food prices (Chapter 3) and rural risk-sharing mechanisms 
(Chapter 4). Both chapters also examine effects of the conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program on rural vulnerability in Mexico. 
 
37 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Poverty and Employment Problems: 
The Case of Haiti 
 
 
2-1. Introduction 
Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)1: its Gross 
Domestic Products (GDP) per capita was US$729 in 2008 and its UNDP Human 
Development Index (HDI, 2009) was 0.532, ranked 149th among 182 countries. Its 
population is about 9.9 million in 2009, making it the most densely populated country in 
LAC. The Haitian economy has fallen into a negative trend after the coup in 1991, 
which was followed by political instability and the embargo period. In 2004, another 
political turmoil occurred when the then President Aristide went into exile forced. Since 
President Preval was elected in 2006 with the active interventions of the international 
community, the economic and social situation has been improving. Even though the 
economic growth has resumed since 2004, Haiti has still not recovered the level of GDP 
per capita it had in 1990, as shown in Figure 2-1.  
According to Lundahl (1983; 2004), the causes of poverty in Haiti lie in the low 
productivity and overpopulation of the small farming sector that dominates the Haitian 
economy. As a result, the falling income in the countryside pushes people into the cities, 
especially to Port-au-Prince, which displays all the characteristics of overcrowding, 
with high open unemployment, most of the urban labor force in informal 
self-employment, insufficient physical infrastructure, etc. (Lundahl, 2004) 
 
                                                 
1
 World Bank Country Brief: http://web.worldbank.org/ (accessed on Aug. 6, 2010) 
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The Living Conditions Survey in Haiti in 2001 shows that nearly 80 percent of the 
population lives below the poverty line, and about 30 percent of main household 
providers are unemployed or inactive. In addition, the opportunity for wage 
employment is very limited (only 10 percent of main household providers are engaged 
in it). Furthermore, it is estimated that between 70 and 80 percent of the labor force is 
absorbed by the informal sector (Jadotte, 2004). Thus economic development and the 
creation of sufficient job opportunities are urgently needed to reduce poverty in Haiti. 
However, the devastating earthquake in January 2010 has virtually destroyed its 
economy that had just started to recover. The fact that there had not been an autonomous 
economy in Haiti even before the earthquake will present great challenges for rebuilding 
a new structure. Taking into account these difficulties, this study considers wage income 
a key factor for poverty reduction in Haiti. The discussion in this chapter will be 
focused on the relationship between poverty, inequality and the occupational choice of a 
household, and subsequently on the probability of becoming a wage worker and on the 
determinants of wage income.  
The next section presents an overview of the poverty and inequality in Haiti as well 
as the characteristics of households’ income sources. Wage income is identified as an 
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important income source that is useful for escaping poverty. In Section 2-3, we conduct 
an empirical analysis of the job selection of main household providers using a 
multinomial logit model. Our analysis reveals the lack of job opportunities in Haiti, and 
underscores that education and remittance income play important roles in determining 
the occupations of main providers. Section 2-4 estimates the probability of becoming a 
wage worker using a probit model and then estimates a wage equation using a sample 
selection model. Section 2-5 concludes this chapter and presents the implications for job 
creation and consequently, for poverty reduction. 
 
2-2. Poverty and Inequality in Haiti 
2-2-1. Overview 
Table 2-1 presents the geographical distribution of poverty in Haiti. At the national 
level, 77 percent of the population lived below the poverty line of US$2 per day and 56 
percent of the population lived in extreme poverty (less than US$1 per day) in 2001. It 
is noteworthy that poverty was mainly a rural phenomenon because two-thirds of the 
total population lived in rural areas, of which 67 percent and 88 percent were extremely 
poor and poor, respectively. A weighted average (by population) indicated as ‘H1 
contribution’ in the table shows that 77 percent of the extreme poor lived in rural areas. 
 
 
Extreme
Poverty (H1)a Poverty (H2)
b Contribution
(H1) Population Share
Metropolitan area 23 45 9 23
Other urban area 57 76 14 14
Rural area 67 88 77 63
National 56 77 100 100
Notes:
a) less than US$1 per day
b) less than US$2 per day
Source: Sletten and Egset (2004) Table 3.
Table 2-1. Geographical Distribution of Poverty in Haiti, 2001
(Percent)
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Haiti is not only the poorest countries, but also the one with the most unequal 
distribution of income in LAC, a region that is known as the most unequal region in the 
world. As shown in Table 2-2, Haiti’s Gini coefficient is 0.652 in 2001, making it higher 
than that of Brazil, the country that had always been regarded as the most unequal 
among the LAC countries (Jadotte, 2007). 
 
 
 
2-2-2. Household Income Sources 
As we see in Figure 2-2, the main income sources of Haitian households are 
self-employment (36.6 percent), wages (20.6 percent), and transfers (25.5 percent). One 
of the characteristics of Haiti’s income composition is that the wage share is relatively 
small (only 20.6 percent) while self-employment (36.6 percent) is the principal source 
and transfers (three-quarters of them consist of foreign remittances) are the second most 
important (25.5 percent). In fact, consumption levels have been maintained by 
remittances that have been increased since mid 1990s while GDP per capita declined 
because of political and economic turmoil (World Bank, 2006). However, rural people 
have only a limited access to wages and transfers, which are important income sources 
to alleviate poverty in Haiti3. Self-employment (43.3 percent) and self-consumption 
                                                 
2
 Calculation based on household survey data in 2001 (Jadotte, 2007). 
3
 Wages and transfers account for only 9.1 percent and 16.4 percent of the total average 
Haiti 0.65
Brazil 0.60
LAC 0.49
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.47
South-Asia 0.32
Source: Jadotte (2007) Table 1.
Table 2-2. Gini Index 
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(24.7 percent) are the most important source in rural areas. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3 presents the income composition of the average household in each income 
quintile. It should be noted that self-employment is the most important income source 
for all the quintiles. Specifically, it accounts for 52.4 percent of the total income in Q1 
(the poorest). However, the share of self-employment decreases and that of wage 
income increases in households of richer quintiles. For instance, wage income accounts 
for more than 25 percent in the richest quintile (Q5), although its share is well below 10 
percent in Q1–Q3. It is also notable that self-consumption is the second most important 
source of income for Q2–Q4 households, which indicates that the households in these 
quintiles (Q2–Q4) are most likely engaged in agriculture. In contrast, it is likely that 
                                                                                                                                               
income in rural areas, while their shares are 29.6 percent and 30.0 percent in the 
metropolitan area and 14.7 percent and 31.6 percent in other urban areas, respectively 
(MPCE, 2004).  
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most people who belong to Q5 have non-agricultural work because self-consumption is 
extremely low. 
 
 
 
In summary, i) Haiti is characterized by extremely high poverty incidence and 
inequality. ii) The rural population is still dominant and most of the rural poor depend 
mainly on self-employment and self-consumption. iii) The fact that 77 percent of the 
population lived below the poverty line suggests that most households belonging to Q1–
Q4 are poor, and that self-employment is their principal income source. Access to wage 
income and transfers plays an important role in enabling escape from poverty in Haiti. 
In this respect, agricultural development and increasing wage employment are 
expected to be key factors for economic growth and poverty reduction in Haiti. 
Although numerous research efforts have elucidated agricultural development4, few 
                                                 
4
 For rural poverty analyses and agricultural development, see World Bank (2005; 
2006) and Verner (2005; 2008). Arias et al. (2006) examine coffee sector, which has 
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studies have examined issues relating to wage job opportunities. Furthermore, 
agricultural development itself could have limitations due to difficult natural conditions 
in Haiti, such as the demographic pressure that causes the division of arable land into 
smaller plots (in 2001, nearly 78 percent of farmers owned less than 2 ha. of land), a 
mountainous topography in which two-thirds of the farmland have slopes of more than 
20 percent, and severe soil erosion. (World Bank, 2005; MPCE, 2007). Also, as Table 
2-3 shows, although one half of the employment is in agriculture, its value-added is 
relatively low (less than 30 percent) compared to other sectors. Therefore, in addition to 
agricultural reform, the development of non-agricultural sectors which have higher 
productivity would be indispensable for Haitian economic development, as many 
development theories suggest, in order to absorb rural overpopulation.  
 
 
 
For these reasons, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to employment problems 
in Haiti, with a special emphasis on wage employment. 
 
2-3. Lack of Job Opportunities and Occupational Choice 
In this section, issues of the occupational choice of main household providers will be 
analyzed using the Living Conditions Survey in Haiti 2001 (Enquete sur les Conditions 
de Vie en Haiti: ECVH-2001). This is a multi-topic national household survey 
                                                                                                                                               
been the most important sector for agricultural export. For the government’s agricultural 
development strategies, see I-PRSP (2006), MPCE (2007), and so on. 
Agriculture Industry Service Agriculture Industry Service
Value Added (% of GDP) 29.7 16.2 54.1 27.9 16.8 55.3
Employment (%) 50.6 10.7 38.7 50.4* 8.0* 41.3*
Note: Data with asterisk are those of 2001 by own calculations based on ECVH 2001.
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011.
Table 2-3. Sector Production and Employment
1999 2002
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commissioned by the UNDP and implemented by the Haitian statistical office (Institut 
Haitien de Statistique et d'Informatique: IHSI) in collaboration with Fafo5. The data 
reflect the responses of 7,810 households and 33,007 individuals nationwide. This 
household survey is the only one available and is most comprehensive microdata on 
Haiti to date.  
 
2-3-1. Overview 
Table 2-4 presents the principal jobs of main providers (age 15–65) of households. 
Main providers who are inactive or unemployed account for as much as 30 percent of 
the total, not only at the national level, but also in both urban and rural areas. Wage 
employees are only about 11 percent of the total at the national level (19 percent in 
urban areas and only 6 percent in rural areas). The rest (about 60 percent) are 
categorized as self-employed either in agricultural or non-agricultural sectors at the 
national level. The data clearly indicate that job opportunities are limited in Haiti. 
 
 
 
The relationship between occupational distribution and poverty and inequality can be 
                                                 
5
 Fafo is a Norwegian independent and multidisciplinary research foundation.  
All Urban Rural
Inactive 19.55 17.99 20.41
Unemployment 10.12 14.11 7.9
Wage Employment 10.73 18.72 6.28
Self-employment (non-agriculture) 27.52 33.56 24.16
Self-employment (agriculture) 32.09 15.62 41.25
Total 100 100 100
Sample Size 5,771 2,062 3,709
Note: 'Family assistance' and 'wage employment in agriculture' are excluded.
Source: Author's calculation based on ECVH 2001.
Table 2-4. Principal Jobs of Main Providers (Age 15–65), 2001
(percent)
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described as follows. Figure 2-4 presents the main provider’s occupational choice by 
income quintiles of households. The share of wage employment is sharply higher (26.9 
percent) among main providers in the richest quintile (Q5), while the share of 
agricultural self-employment is remarkably low (12.9 percent). Underscoring the clear 
difference of job choice between poor (Q1–Q4) and non-poor households (Q5), we can 
again infer that access to wage employment (especially in the non-agricultural sector) 
must play a key role in a person’s escape from poverty. 
Previous studies on the job market in Haiti have revealed the importance of education 
in obtaining wage labor. Verner (2005; 2008) reported that the probability of getting 
employment in the non-farm sector is positively and significantly related to education 
levels in Haiti. Other regression results of earnings functions (income per capita or 
wage) reveal that education level has positive and strong effects on the level of earnings 
in Haiti (Sletten and Egset, 2004; Verner, 2008; Jadotte, 2006). 
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Wage employment requires higher skills than those of other occupations. Table 2-5 
shows the employment sectors of active workers’ primary jobs. Almost 70 percent of 
wage employment derives from the service sector. It is also notable that the service 
sector’s labor force includes jobs that require high skills such as public administration 
(8.6 percent), education (23.1 percent), and health (6.7 percent), which suggests that 
only workers with high skills (signaled by high education) are eligible to become wage 
workers. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5 shows the correlation between a main provider’s principal job and their 
education level. A clear correlation exists between wage employment and tertiary 
Averagea
Wage
employment
Self-
employment
Agriculture, Fishing and Extracts 50.4 5.9 55.1
Agriculture 48.8 5.3 53.2
Fishing 1.3 0.1 1.6
Extraction 0.3 0.5 0.3
Industry and Construction 8.0 20.1 6.2
Manufacturing 5.6 12.4 4.6
Electricity, gas and water production 0.2 0.7 0.1
Construction 2.3 7.1 1.5
Commerce 27.3 5.9 32.6
Services 14.0 68.1 5.7
Hotels and restaurants 1.3 1.1 1.4
Transports and communication 1.6 4.6 1.3
Financial 0.2 1.0 0.0
Real estate and business services 1.1 4.7 0.5
Public administration and services 1.2 8.6 0.1
Education 3.4 23.1 0.3
Health and social action 1.2 6.7 0.3
Other community, social and personal services 2.0 7.7 1.1
Other services 2.0 10.6 0.7
Total 100 100 100
a)
 'Average' includes wage employment, self-employment and family assistance.
Source: Author's calculation based on ECVH 2001. 
(Percent)
Table 2-5. Employment Sectors of Active Worker’s Primary Job, 2001
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education: more than 60 percent of those who have tertiary education are engaged in 
wage employment, although only 10 percent of workers that have completed a primary 
education live on wages. The share is almost zero for those who have not completed any 
level of education. Workers with higher education are more likely to be wage workers. 
We can also observe that the share of self-employment in agriculture is lower for higher 
education levels. None of the main providers with tertiary education lives on agriculture 
work. 
 
 
 
Another important determinant of occupational choice is remittances from abroad. As 
described in the previous section, transfers are the second major income source for 
Haitian households at an aggregate level (Fig. 2-3). The importance of transfers, 
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especially remittances from abroad6, is pointed out in many studies7. When it comes to 
the remittance inflows, Haiti’s figures are outstanding compared to other Latin 
American countries: workers’ remittances as a share of GDP increased from 5 percent in 
1996 to 21.5 percent in 2006 (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2010). More remarkably, 
workers’ remittances as a share of exports of goods amount to 211.1 percent in 2006 
(Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2010). In addition, data from the Living Conditions Survey in 
Haiti (ECVH 2001) shows that a quarter of all households whose main providers are 
aged 15–65 receive remittances. Consequently, consumption levels have been 
maintained by remittances that have increased continually since the mid-1990s, while 
GDP per capita declined due to political and economic turmoil (World Bank, 2006). 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Three quarters of the transfers are foreign remittances (Sletten and Egset, 2004).  
According to Lundahl (2004), the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad estimates about 
2.5 million Haitian emigrants living in the United States, Canada, the Dominican 
Republic, Caribbean countries, and France, which represent more than a quarter of the 
total population of Haiti. 
7
 See Orozco (2006) for details about remittance economy in Haiti especially the 
conditions of migrants in the United States.  
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Figure 2-6 presents the relationship between job choice and the share of remittances 
in total household income. The figure shows that main providers are most likely to be 
self-employed (both in agriculture (37 percent) and in non-agriculture (26 percent)) if 
they do not receive remittances at all. In contrast, the share of self-employment 
(especially in agriculture) declines and the respective shares of those who are inactive 
and unemployed increase as the proportion of remittances exceeds 50 percent. This fact 
suggests a correlation between job choice (and especially the choice of whether to work 
or not to work) and the receipt of remittances. The following subsections describe 
econometric analyses of this occupational choice using a multinomial logit model. 
 
2-3-2. Model 
We assume that the occupational choice of workers can be described by the following 
multinomial logit function: 
   ml lijiijp 1 )exp( )exp( ȕxȕx ,    (2.1) 
where ݌�௝ represents the probability that individual � chooses job ݆. There are m 
kinds of different job alternatives: five in this case (inactive, unemployment, wage 
employment in the non-agricultural sector, self-employment in the non-agricultural 
sector, and self-employment in the agricultural sector). In addition, �� represents a 
vector of case-specific independent variables including a constant, variables related to 
education and remittances, and other control variables that are presumed to affect job 
choice. 
 
2-3-3. Regression Results 
Table 2-6 presents the regression results of the model described above. The sample 
only includes main household providers aged 15–65. The summary statistics are in 
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Appendix (Table A2-1). The control variables are age, age squared, female dummy 
(female=1), marriage dummy (married=1), rural dummy (equal to 1 if the main 
provider lives in rural areas at present), born in Ouest dummy (equal to 1 if the main 
provider was born in the Ouest (capital) region). Education related variables (dummies) 
are primary (equal to 1 if the main provider has completed primary education) and 
secondary (equal to 1 if the main provider has completed at least a secondary education, 
including those who have tertiary education). Regarding remittance-related variables, a 
dummy (equal to 1 if the household receives foreign remittances irrespective of its 
amount) is used in the first model and the share of foreign remittances in the total 
household income is used in the second model. The results of the two models are similar, 
but the second model fits slightly better than the first. 
The results portray the likelihood of being inactive, unemployed, a wage worker or 
self-employed in agriculture relative to self-employment in non-agriculture. The 
estimated coefficients are transformed to relative risk ratios8. 
First, the effect of education on job choice is positive and significant only for wage 
employment (the relative risk ratio is larger than 1). Having a certain level of education 
increases the likelihood of wage employment (relative to self-employment in 
non-agriculture): the odds of choosing wage employment are about 1.7 times greater if a 
main provider has completed primary education. The amount increases to more than 
five times if secondary or higher education is completed, compared to no education 
completed, which indicates that wage employment demands relatively higher skills 
(education attainment) than other occupations. In contrast, the probabilities of choosing 
                                                 
8
 The odds ratio or relative risk ratio of choosing alternative j rather than alternative 1 
(base) is given as 
)exp()1Pr(
)Pr(
ji
i
i
y
jy ȕx
 
so exp ሺ�௝௞ሻ gives the proportionate change in the relative risk of choosing alternative j 
rather than alternative 1 (base) when �௝௞ changes by one unit (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009: p.486). 
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other job alternatives (inactive, unemployment, or self-employed in agriculture) 
decrease relative to self-employment in non-agriculture as the education level increases. 
In particular, main providers engaged in agriculture have a lower educational level even 
compared to those who are inactive or unemployed (in the case of primary education 
completed, the odds decrease by about 27–34 percent for inactive and unemployed 
individuals, and by more than 50 percent for agriculture). The coefficient of the 
secondary dummy for unemployment is not significant and the odds relative to 
self-employment in non-agriculture do not change (the relative risk ratio is nearly 1), 
which might imply that those who have certain education levels seek job opportunities 
other than agriculture whereas those with much higher education are more likely to 
become wage workers. Agriculture might not be profitable at all and might serve as the 
last resort for Haitian households. 
The regression results reveal that those who have a certain level of education tend to 
choose non-agricultural jobs (including unemployment); they are more likely to choose 
wage employment if they have higher education. However, we might also infer the 
existence of a strong eligibility for wage employment because of the limited supply of 
skilled workers. In fact, Haitian educational levels are well below the LAC average. For 
example, the youth (aged 15–24) illiteracy rate in 2005 was 34 percent in Haiti, in 
contrast with 2–3 percent in Mexico and 6 percent in the Dominican Republic and 
throughout the LAC region (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2010). Additionally, data from 
ECVH 2001 show that half of the main providers aged 15–65 had completed no 
education, although almost 20 percent had completed secondary education; moreover, 
those who had completed tertiary education comprised only 1 percent. 
The problem of education in Haiti is that public resources devoted to education are 
scarce compared to many other countries in the LAC region. According to 
Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2010), the private sector––the primary vehicle by which access 
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to education is possible in Haiti––has become a substitute for public investment rather 
than a complement. Almost 90 percent of all schools in Haiti are private or parochial. 
Despite a constitutional guarantee of free education, public schools are costly and are of 
very low quality. Consequently, access to education remains problematic for vulnerable 
groups; it can be a heavy financial burden whether the child attends public or private 
schools (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2010). Improving both the education level and quality 
in Haiti, therefore, is of utmost importance. 
However, improvements in education and increases in job opportunities are rather 
medium or long term objectives. The most practical and only way to earn flow income 
for the immediate improvement of living conditions, especially after the earthquake, 
must be via remittances from abroad.  
 With respect to the effect of foreign remittances on the occupational choice, the 
regression results show that the likelihood of being inactive or unemployed is higher 
when the main provider has remittance income and increases concomitantly with the 
increasing share of total household income. For inactive people, for example, the odds 
relative to self-employment in non-agriculture becomes 1.3 times higher if the main 
provider receives some sort of remittance (as in the first model) and four times greater if 
the household income consists only of remittances (as in the second model). In contrast, 
main providers are less likely to be engaged in wage employment or in agriculture 
(compared to self-employment in non-agriculture) if they receive remittances, and such 
employment likelihood continues to decrease concomitantly with an increase in 
remittances in the total income. This result suggests that remittance income makes main 
providers choose not to work, since remittances increase their reservation wages9. 
                                                 
9
 Jadotte (2009) assesses the impact of remittances on labor market outcomes using 
data from ECVH 2001. He indicates that remittances increase the recipients’ reservation 
wages because of the access to the non-market income flow. Furthermore, when we 
compare the average wage earnings between remittance receivers and non-receivers, 
remittance receivers earn higher wage (statistically significant at 5 percent). However, 
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Alternatively, it could be said that they become reliant on remittances because job 
opportunities are very limited and they cannot earn sufficient income to satisfy their 
daily needs. 
Some other control variables also present interesting implications. First, female main 
providers are more likely to choose self-employment in non-agriculture than any other 
job alternative (the relative risk ratios of the coefficients of the female dummy are all 
less than 1). With respect to the rural dummy, it can be concluded that living in rural 
areas increases the probability of choosing agriculture or being inactive compared to 
self-employment in non-agriculture, and reduces the probability of choosing wage 
employment. Furthermore, it turns out that whether the main provider was born in the 
capital region or not is an important determinant of job choice: those who were born in 
Ouest are more likely to be wage workers or unemployed. Easier access to the capital 
city could be an advantage in choosing a better job (especially when it comes to 
choosing wage employment). In this respect, the reason why the likelihood of 
unemployment increases for those who were born in Ouest can be explained by the lack 
of job opportunities: people might wait for a good job opportunity, taking advantage of 
easier access to the capital city (and, therefore, to better information and infrastructure). 
Age and marriage, on the other hand, seem to have only weak effects on job choice 
because the magnitude of relative risk ratios is close to unity for most alternatives. 
                                                                                                                                               
there is no statistically significant difference between wage workers in urban areas, but 
rural wage workers do have significant differences.  
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2-4. Wage Regression 
In this section, a wage regression is conducted to analyze the determinants of this 
important income source for Haitian economic development and poverty alleviation. We 
use the sample selection model in estimating the wage equation taking into account the 
facts that the access to wage works is extremely limited in Haiti as we have analyzed in 
the previous sections. The probability of being a wage worker is estimated by using a 
probit model before the wage regression to see the determinants of the participation in 
the wage market. Policy implications will be suggested after the regression analysis. 
The data used hereafter is also the Living Condition Survey in Haiti 2001 (ECVH 2001), 
but the sample unit are individuals this time.  
 
2-4-1. Literature Review 
Some researchers have already estimated income equations of Haiti. Sletten and 
Egset (2004) carried out an income regression in Haiti. The results show that living in 
rural areas has a strong negative impact on household income, and that education and 
household main provider’s employment status (especially being a wage worker) has 
positive impacts.  
Verner (2005; 2008) conducts a quintile regression to analyze the determinants of the 
labor income (wage workers and self-employed workers). The main results are as 
follows; education plays an important part in the income determination process and face 
decreasing returns across the income distribution (as people belong to a richer group). 
Returns to experience (proxied by age) are very low and also falling across the income 
distribution. Females earn more than men at the median income quintile in urban areas, 
whereas they are paid less in 25th and median quintiles in rural areas. Incomes in 
agriculture are lower than other sectors (such as industry and services). She also 
estimates the probability of being employed in non-agricultural sector by using the 
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probit model and finds that education, gender, location and migration status are the 
important factors (Verner, 2005; 2008).  
Different from previous studies discussed above, we will put emphasis exclusively on 
wage income as we have identified that wage income is one of the key factors to get out 
of poverty in the previous sections even though the opportunity for wage employment is 
very limited in Haiti.   
 
2-4-2. Regression Method10 
As mentioned above, we use the maximum likelihood version of the Heckit sample 
selection model to estimate the wage equation. For incidental truncation, the sample is 
representative of the entire population, but the observations on the dependent variable 
are truncated according to a rule whose errors are correlated with the errors from the 
equation of interest. We do not observe y (in this case, wage income) because of the 
outcome of some other variable, which generates the selection indicator, s (whether 
workers participate in the wage market or not). We can imagine fitting a binominal 
probit model that predicts the individual’s probability of participation. In this 
circumstance, ݏ� is set to one if they participate in the wage market and zero otherwise.  
   )0( vIs uy ii ii Ȗzȕx
      (2.2) 
where we assume that the explanatory factors in x satisfy the zero-conditional mean 
assumption �ሺ�ݑሻ = Ͳ. The �ሺ∙ሻ function equals 1 if its argument is true and is zero 
otherwise. We observe ݕ� if ݏ� = ͳ. The selection function (the second one of the 
equation (2.2)) contains a set of explanatory factors z. The error term in the selection 
equation, v, is assumed to have a zero-conditional mean: �ሺܢ�ሻ = Ͳ. We assume that v 
follows a standard normal distribution.  
                                                 
10
 The explanation of this section is mainly based on Baum (2006). 
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As mentioned above, incidental truncation arises when there is a nonzero correlation 
between u and v. If these error terms are both normally distributed with zero means, the 
conditional expectation of u is �ሺݑ|�ሻ = ��, where � is the correlation between u and 
v. Then from the equation (2.2),  
vvyE  xȕz ),|(
    (2.3) 
We cannot observe v, but s is related to v by (2.2). Equation (2.3) then becomes  
),|(),|( svEvyE zxȕz 
   (2.4) 
The conditional expectation �ሺ�|ܢ, ݏሻ for ݏ� = ͳ is merely λ, the inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR). Therefore, we must augment the equation (2.2) with the IMR:  
)()1,|(  zxȕz syE
   (2.5) 
If  � ≠ Ͳ, OLS estimates from the incidentally truncated sample will not consistently 
estimate � unless the IMR term is included. However, if � = Ͳ, the OLS regression 
will yield consistent estimates.  
To compute the IMR term for each observation ݕ� (ݏ� = ͳ), we use a binominal probit 
model:  
)()|1Pr( zz s
    (2.6) 
This two-step procedure is often termed the Heckit model.  
Instead, we can use a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure to jointly estimate �, γ, 
and  �. According to Wooldridge (2002), the ML procedure will be more efficient than 
the two-step procedure under joint normality of u and v. If we introduce the stronger 
assumption that ሺݑ, �ሻ  is a bivariate normal with mean zero, ��ݎሺݑሻ = �ଵଶ , ܥ݋�ሺݑ, �ሻ = �ଵଶ, and ��ݎሺ�ሻ = ͳ, then partial maximum likelihood estimation can be 
used. The partial log likelihood is obtained by summing ��ሺ�ሻ across all observations11:        )log(/)(log )1()(log )(1log)1()( 11 21212122112    


ȕx
ȕxȖz
Ȗzθ
ii
iiii
iii
y
ys
sl
    (2.7) 
                                                 
11
 See Wooldridge (2002: p.566) for more details.  
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where ݏ� = ͳ picks out when ݕ� is observed.  
 
2-4-3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2-7 shows the variables used in the regression. The sample is limited to 
economically active12 individuals whose age is between 15 and 65. Wage income (per 
year in local currency (gourdes13)) includes income from any kind of wage works and 
excludes any other income sources such as self-employment, transfers or property 
incomes. It has a large disparity from 0 to 510,000 gourdes. When taking log, wages 
that equal to zero become a missing value. This implies that only 21.8 percent of the 
sample (1573 individuals) are wage workers, whose number is very small compared to 
other countries.  
Haiti has 9 regions and the capital (Port-au-Prince) is in Ouest region. Thus Ouest is 
the most developed region, where most of the Haitian industrial sector is located, 
followed by Nord region. Other regions are exclusively agriculture-oriented. With 
respect to the education, it is surprising that half of the sample have not completed the 
primary education (no education) and only 2 percent have tertiary education. Those who 
have enough command of French14, which is correlated with the level of secondary 
education or higher and can be served as a proxy of human capital, account for 29 
percent of the sample. As to employment sectors, agriculture and service and commerce 
are the leading sectors with 45 percent and 46 percent of employment respectively while 
industry and construction only accounts for 9 percent.  
  We first analyze what kinds of individuals are more likely to become a wage worker 
by using the probit model. Then, we estimate the wage equation by using the Heckit 
                                                 
12
 About 34 percent of the sample (age 15–65) is categorized as economically inactive. 
Still quite a few of them live on income transfers (domestic as well as foreign) and 
self-consumption in case of farmers since they are one of the most important income 
sources for Haitians (See Figures 2-2 and 2-3 in Section 2-2).  
13
 38.35 Gourdes for 1 US dollar for 2004 (World Development Indicators 2007). 
14
 Haiti has two official languages: French and Creole.  
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sample selection model.  
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
wage 7212 3,270.84 16,262.29 0 510,000.00
logwage 1573 8.21 1.78 2.48 13.14
age 7212 39.88 12.23 15 65
sqage 7212 1,740.08 1,009.36 225.00 4,225.00
female 7212 0.46 0.50 0 1
married 7212 0.65 0.48 0 1
metropolitan 7212 0.14 0.35 0 1
other urban 7212 0.15 0.36 0 1
rural 7212 0.71 0.45 0 1
ouest 7212 0.27 0.44 0 1
sudest 7212 0.09 0.28 0 1
nord 7212 0.07 0.26 0 1
nordest 7212 0.04 0.19 0 1
artibonite 7212 0.13 0.33 0 1
centre 7212 0.11 0.31 0 1
sud 7212 0.11 0.31 0 1
grandanse 7212 0.11 0.32 0 1
nordouest 7212 0.08 0.27 0 1
no education 7212 0.50 0.50 0 1
primary 7212 0.30 0.46 0 1
secondary 7212 0.19 0.39 0 1
superior 7212 0.02 0.14 0 1
french 7138 0.29 0.45 0 1
agriculture 7212 0.45 0.50 0 1
Note: 'sqage' means age squared. 
1
service &
commerce
7212 0.46 0.50 0 1
industry &
construction
7212 0.09 0.28 0
Table 2-7.  Summary Statistics for Wage Regressions
Living Areas
Regions
Education and Human Capital
Employment Sectors
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2-4-4. Regression Results 
2-4-4-1. Probability of Being a Wage Worker 
Table 2-8 shows the results of the probit model that estimates the probability of being 
a wage worker. The dependent variable is binary and equals 1 if an individual is a wage 
worker and zero otherwise. Thus the probability of being a wage worker rises when the 
coefficients have a positive sign and the probability decreases when the coefficients are 
negative. The independent variables we use in the probit model are age, age squared, 
living area dummies (metropolitan or rural compared to other urban areas) or regional 
dummy (Ouest compared to other regions), marital status dummy (married=1), female 
dummy (female=1), and human capital dummy proxied by french (whether the 
individual has a good command of French). We use the living area dummies and the 
regional dummy separately because the metropolitan areas virtually correspond to Ouest 
region. Marginal effects of the coefficients are shown in the table.  
The results shows age is positive and age squared negative (but the marginal effects 
are virtually zero) and both are statistically significant in both columns. Individuals are 
more likely to be a wage worker when they get older. But its effect is relatively small. 
Living area and regional dummies have expected signs and are statistically significant. 
People living in the metropolitan area have 8.3 percent more possibility of being a wage 
worker and those living in rural areas have 4.4 percent less possibility than those living 
in other urban areas. The possibility increases by 5.9 percent in case of people living in 
the capital region (Ouest), compared to those living in other regions. Married dummy is 
negative and becomes statistically significant in both columns. Female dummy is 
negative and statistically significant in both columns; being female decreases the 
probability of becoming a wage worker by about 15 percent. Finally, the results indicate 
that human capital is an important determinant of the participation in the wage market; 
having a good command of French increases the probability by 11.8 percent in the first 
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column and by 14.5 percent in the second column.  
 
 
 
In summary, having enough human capital and living in the capital (the metropolitan 
area) increase the probability of becoming a wage worker, while females and those who 
live in rural areas are less likely to be a wage worker.  
 
2-4-4-2. Wage Differentials 
Table 2-9 shows the regression results of the maximum likelihood version of the 
Heckit model. The table shows only the results of the wage equation and those of 
selection equation are omitted. The wage equation is based on the Mincer type model 
and we use the following independent variables: age and age squared as proxies for 
experience, living area dummies (metropolitan and rural compared to other urban areas) 
or regional dummy (Ouest compared to other regions), female dummy, education 
age 0.009 (3.44)*** 0.010 (3.82)***
sqage -0.000 (4.03)*** -0.000 (4.44)***
metro* 0.083 (4.29)***
rural* -0.044 (2.96)***
ouest* 0.059 (5.04)***
married* -0.030 (2.69)*** -0.031 (2.81)***
female* -0.158 (16.79)*** -0.151 (16.14)***
french* 0.118 (9.31)*** 0.145 (12.12)***
Observations
LR chi2
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
Notes:
2) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
3) Variables with asterisk(*) mean dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Table 2-8.  Regression Results: Probability of being a Wage Worker 
1) Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
(Probit)
dy/dx dy/dx
(1) (2)
7138 7138
638.42 594.10
0.000 0.000
0.086 0.080
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dummies (primary or secondary education completed or tertiary education compared to 
no education completed), and employment sector dummies (non-agricultural sectors 
compared to agricultural sector) as control variables. we use the same variables as in 
Table 2-8 (probit model) for the selection equation.  
 
 
 
The results indicate that all the variables but female dummy have expected signs and 
age 0.051 (2.69)*** 0.054 (2.75)***
sqage -0.000 (2.06)** -0.001 (2.04)**
metro 0.599 (5.03)***
rural -0.286 (2.64)***
ouest 0.480 (5.43)***
female 0.133 (1.16) 0.206 (1.80)*
primary 0.376 (4.43)*** 0.424 (4.88)***
secondary 0.646 (6.05)*** 0.792 (7.18)***
superior 1.534 (8.85)*** 1.816 (10.36)***
Constant 7.410 (16.53)*** 7.027 (14.86)***
Observations
Uncensored obs
Wald chi2
Prob > chi2 
 chi2(1) 
Prob > chi2 
Notes:
2) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
3) The same variables as those of Table 2-8 are used in the selection equation. 
(Only Wage Equation)
Table 2-9. Regression Results: maximum likelihood Heckit
Model
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):  
12.12 16.12
service &
commerce
1.122 (12.73)*** 1.276 (14.40)***
7138 7138
dependent variable: logwage
(1) (2)
industry &
construction
1) absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
1548 1548
790.63 824.79
0.000 0.000
0.928 (8.00)*** 1.172 (10.04)***
0.001 0.000
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statistically significant. An individual can earn more when he/she gets older. Living in 
the metropolitan area raises wage levels by 59.9 percent while living in rural areas 
lowers them by 28.6 percent compared to living in other urban areas. Also, those who 
are in the capital region (Ouest) can get 48.0 percent more wages than those in other 
regions. We should note that the female dummy becomes positive in both columns and 
is statistically significant at 10 percent level in the second column since we usually 
expect that the dummy becomes negative in this type of wage regressions. This means 
that in Haiti, different from many other countries in the world, females earn the same or 
even higher wage than males, other things being controlled, once they enter in the wage 
market (note that female dummy is negative in the probit model). However, this result is 
consistent with that of other income regressions such as Verner (2005; 2008). We will 
discuss this issue in the next subsection.  
Education has positive effects on wage levels and the returns to education are not 
constant. There exist wage premiums for workers with higher education. Primary 
completed workers can get 37.6 percent more wages than primary uncompleted workers 
while those with secondary completed and superior education get 64.6 percent and 
153.4 percent more wages respectively in the first column. The percentage is even 
higher in the second column. Working in non-agricultural sectors such as industry and 
construction and service and commerce is also an important factor to increase wages 
since those working in these non-agricultural sectors earn more than double the wages 
of agricultural sectors, controlling for all the other variables.  
In summary, gender, living areas and education (human capital) have effects both in 
entering the wage market and in determining wage levels. We will study each of these 
factors in details in the next subsection and draw some implications.   
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2-4-5. Implications 
2-4-5-1. Gender 
  The results of the wage equation indicate that in Haiti, different from many other 
countries, females can earn the same as or even higher wages than males, other things 
being controlled while females have more difficulties in participating in the wage 
market. This is very unique to Haiti and thus we might need to look for the reasons. One 
possible answer is the different employment structure between men and women15.  
  Table 2-10 shows the wage workers’ employment structure by gender. We can note 
that female wage workers are concentrated exclusively in the service and commerce 
sector (especially in public service sectors) and account for 70 percent while almost half 
of the male wage workers are in the agricultural sector (47.1 percent). Since 
non-agricultural sector (and especially the service sector) is more skilled than 
agricultural sector, we can infer that this remarkable difference in employment structure 
favors female wages. Also, urban-rural differences should be counted in as Verner 
(2008) points out. Even though we have controlled the employment structure by sector 
and living area/region dummies in the wage regression, we will need some robustness 
checks of the regression results by taking into account these facts more precisely. we 
will leave this issue for the future tasks.  
Still we should be careful that female participation in the wage market is limited 
compared to males since more than 70 percent of the wage workers are males in Table 
2-10. This gender discrimination of participation is also proved in the probit regression 
in Table 2-8 (female dummy was negative). In any cases, we can draw an important 
implication from these regression results that Haiti should promote the female 
participation in the wage market both in terms of the advantage of getting higher wages 
and in terms of the disadvantages of becoming a wage worker.  
                                                 
15
 Verner (2008) also suggests that one of the reasons of this gender-earnings gap may, 
to some degree, be explained by choice of jobs by women in urban and rural areas.  
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2-4-5-2. Education 
  There’s no doubt that human capital is crucial to a country’s economic development 
and education plays a key role in human capital development. The same as many other 
countries in the world, there exists a strong correlation between income (wage) levels 
and educational attainments in Haiti. We have also proven in the regression results that 
human capital is also an important determinant factor in participating in the wage 
market, which implies that higher skills are required in the wage market.  
  Another interesting point is the high wage premium for more educated (superior) 
workers. Table 2-11 shows the wage premium of each level of education compared to its 
lower level calculating from the wage regression results in Table 2-9. The wage 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Agriculture, Fishing and Extracts Industry 536 47.1 96 22.07
529 46.49 95 21.84
4 0.35 0 0
3 0.26 1 0.23
Industry and Construction 155 13.62 32 7.36
90 7.91 30 6.9
1 0.09 1 0.23
64 5.62 1 0.23
Services and Commerce 447 39.27 307 70.58
61 5.36 68 15.63
3 0.26 7 1.61
43 3.78 1 0.23
8 0.7 2 0.46
34 2.99 13 2.99
266 23.37 172 39.55
Public administration and services 67 5.89 15 3.45
Education 121 10.63 103 23.68
Health and social action 27 2.37 37 8.51
Other community, social and personal services 51 4.48 17 3.91
32 2.81 44 10.11
1138 100 435 100
Source: Author's calculation based on ECVH 2001.
Transports and communication
Table 2-10. Wage Workers' Employment Structure by Gender
Male Female
Agriculture
Fishing
Extracts
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas and water production
Construction
Wholesale and retail commerce, vehicle repair
Hotels and restaurants
Financial
Real estate and business services
Public services (include Education and Health)
Other services
Total
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premium declines from primary to secondary level but increases sharply from secondary 
to tertiary level in both columns. Oshio (2002) points out in this respect that the increase 
of returns from secondary to tertiary education is due to the strong demand for high 
skills, or due to the ‘rationing’ that restricts the supply of high-educated workers. The 
latter would be the case for Haiti since only 2 percent of the economically active 
population aged 15–65 have tertiary education (Table 2-7).  
 
 
 
  However, we shouldn’t disregard the importance of primary education in Haiti. 
Psacharopoulos (1985) summarizes the returns to education for over 60 countries in the 
world and concludes that primary education is the most profitable educational 
investment opportunity, followed by secondary education. This is, according to him, 
because of the interaction between the low cost of primary education (relative to other 
levels) and the substantial productivity between primary school graduates and those 
who are illiterate. In fact, primary education completed workers earn about 40 percent 
more wages than those who haven’t completed any education in Table 2-11.  
  There are serious educational problems not only in higher education but also in basic 
education in Haiti: we can see from Table 2-7 that among the economically active 
population aged 15–65, half of them are categorized as no education completed. 30 
percent completed primary education and 19 percent secondary education. According to 
(1) (2)
No education-Primary 0.376 0.424
Primary-Secondary 0.270 0.368
Secondary-Superior 0.888 1.024
Source: Author's calculation based on Table 2-9.
Note: Wage premium is the difference of the coefficients between each
education level.
Table 2-11. Wage Premium across Education Levels
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Lundahl (2004), Haiti is far from achieving the complete enrollment rate. Yet today, 
almost half of children aged 6-12 are not in school, and of those enrolled, only one-third 
reach fifth grade. Public education spending (1.7 percent of GDP) and the capacity to 
deliver education services are too low. In fact, about 90 percent of primary schools are 
non-public (run by private organizations and NGOs). This extremely poor capacity of 
the government also causes low quality in education (World Bank, 2006). Haitian 
government and the international society should take urgent and comprehensive 
measures to improve both the education level and quality to achieve economic 
development in Haiti.  
 
2-4-5-3. Geographical Disparity 
The regression results indicate that there is a big disparity between metropolitan, 
other urban and rural areas, and also between the capital (Ouest) and the other regions, 
in determining the probability of the participation in the wage market as well as the 
wage levels. These differences in wages can be explained by urban production 
externalities or agglomeration effects. Such external effects are the main explanation for 
why productivity is usually the highest in those areas of a country where economic 
activity is densest (Ciccone, 2006). There is some disagreement about the strength of 
urban production externalities, but even weak urban production externalities can explain 
large spatial differences in productivity (Ciccone, 2006). These differences in 
productivity could have been reflected in the job opportunity and wage differentials 
between living areas (regions).  
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One example of the regional disparity in Haiti is the access to infrastructure. Table 
2-12 shows the household access to infrastructure by living areas and regions. We can 
see a big geographical disparity: more than 90 percent of the households in metropolitan 
areas can access to electricity while its percentage is 22.5 percent in other urban areas 
and only 9.8 percent in rural areas. Also, the difference between Ouest and other regions 
is large in electricity. There’s not much difference in road access (including dirt roads) 
as electricity between metropolitan and other urban areas (but except for rural areas) as 
well as between Ouest and other regions. However, the situation is not the same when 
we limit to the paved road. There is also a disparity in the supply of safe drinking water 
between living areas and regions. This inequality in access to infrastructure should 
affect the development of industry and service sectors outside the capital, and thus the 
employment opportunity and income levels. As Jadotte (2007) points out, balanced 
levels of infrastructure and access to services among the different regions should be 
among policy priority.  
 
2-5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter began with an overview of the situation of poverty and inequality in 
Haiti in Section 2-2, which indicated that wage employment is expected to be the key to 
escaping poverty. However, household survey data revealed that employment 
opportunities are very limited in Haiti: the share of wage employment is small (only 10 
Metropolitan Other Urban Rural Ouest Other Regions
Electricity 91.5% 22.5% 9.8% 58.3% 11.1%
Road to the Dwelling 60.0% 61.3% 37.8% 47.7% 45.3%
Paved Road to the Dwelling 15.0% 7.3% 3.4% 10.4% 4.2%
Piped Drinking Water 17.7% 9.4% 3.2% 11.3% 4.8%
Source: Author's calculation based on ECVH 2001. 
Table 2-12. Household Access to Infrastructure by Living Areas and Regions
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percent) and access to wage employment is virtually restricted to non-poor households 
(mostly to the richest quintile). In Section 2-3, an empirical analysis using the 
multinomial logit model was conducted to identify the determinants of occupational 
choice of main household providers. The results present a clear correlation between 
education and wage employment. However, the fact that only 10 percent of the main 
providers live on wages also implies a higher eligibility of becoming a wage worker 
because of the limited supply of highly skilled workers. With respect to the effect of 
remittances from family members and others in foreign countries, the regression results 
showed whether main providers receive remittances or not; more importantly, the share 
of remittances of the total household income is crucial in their decision of whether or 
not to work. 
The wage regression results in Section 2-4 have shown that education (human 
capital), living areas/regions and gender are important factors in determining the 
participation in the wage market as well as the wage levels. The results, examining each 
of these factors in detail, drew the following implications: i) one of the reasons of the 
female advantage in wage levels might be the difference of employment structure 
between men and women, and we will need some robustness checks for future analyses; 
ii) there is a high wage premium for educated workers (especially superior education) 
due to the limited access to higher education in Haiti, but investing in basic education is 
also important; iii) the geographical disparity could be explained by urban production 
externalities and one example is the difference of access to infrastructure between living 
areas (regions). 
As mentioned in Section 2-2, many studies propose agricultural development as a 
means of improving Haiti’s economy. However, considering the disadvantages and 
limitations of Haitian agriculture (especially those related to overpopulation), it is 
crucial to expand job opportunities (and in particular, wage employment) by developing 
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non-agricultural industries across the country to reduce severe poverty and inequality in 
Haiti. In fact, even though the employment rate in the industrial sector is small (9 
percent), more than 90 percent of total Haitian exports come from the industrial 
(manufacturing) sector16 (UN Comtrade data 2005). Production assembly was the sole 
and most viable industrial sector of the Haitian economy for more than 30 years. Prior 
to the coup in 1991, the industrial sector was more diversified and there were a number 
of foreign-owned firms. Today, employment in this sector has been reduced to about 
two-thirds and virtually all of the companies are owned by Haitians (I-PRSP, 2006; 
Lundahl, 2004). As a result, a lot of qualified people migrated from Haiti during the 
embargo years (Lundahl, 2004). Thus, inviting foreign direct investments (FDIs) by 
taking advantage of Haiti’s abundant labor must be one of the crucial strategies for a 
rapid and efficient development of these sectors17. 
At the same time, improving the educational level and quality is indispensable to 
supplying qualified workers to the labor market and fostering the economic 
development mentioned above and poverty reduction as pointed out in Sections 2-3 and 
2-4. However, improvement in education cannot be achieved in the short run.  
Meanwhile, considering the scarcity of job opportunities that has further been 
reduced by the damage of the earthquake, and the crucial dependence on remittances by 
Haitian households, as discussed in this chapter, remittances are the only way to for 
Haitians to be financially supported in the short run. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2010) 
points out that remittances ameliorate the negative disruptive effect of household 
                                                 
16
 Haiti could take advantages of the geographical proximity to the United States once 
the infrastructure and institutional capacity are improved. Also, there is a preferential 
treatment for Haitian export of textile and garment (HOPEII) to the United States. 
17
 With respect to the service sector, while tourism was once a vital sector of the 
Haitian economy (representing over 20 percent of exports (MPCE, 2007)), it has also 
been seriously damaged by political and social turmoil since the 1960s. Haitian 
government recognizes the importance of these two non-agricultural sectors for the 
country’s development as well as agricultural improvement. See, for example, I-PRSP 
(2006) and MPCE (2007) for the government’s development strategies.  
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out-migration on children’s schooling in some migrating communities and therefore, 
contribute to the accumulation of human capital in the midst of extreme poverty. 
Developed countries could accept Haitian migrants more actively under appropriate 
conditions so that remittance income could contribute not only to the reconstruction of 
the economy, but also to poverty reduction. It would also be necessary to establish a 
scheme that would make more efficient use of foreign remittances by directing them 
towards investments in education18. 
 Finally, this study is mainly based on one-year household survey data from 2001. 
Therefore, it has limitations in obtaining robust conclusions and policy implications. 
More detailed analyses using new comparative micro data will remain for a future study.  
 
 
  
                                                 
18
 IDB has started a project to channel remittances toward human capital accumulation 
in Central America in 2010, which is still a pilot project in El Salvador.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Impacts of the CCT and Rising Food Prices 
on the Consumption of Rural Poor in Mexico 
 
 
3-1. Introduction 
It has been more than 15 years since Mexico’s Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) 
Program: Education, Health and Nutrition Program (Programa de Educación, Salud e 
Alimentación: PROGRESA) was started in 1997 to replace all existing poverty programs. 
Targeting its benefits directly to the population in extreme poverty in rural areas, the 
program was intended (1) to alleviate current poverty through monetary and in-kind 
benefits, and (2) to reduce future levels of poverty by encouraging investment in 
education, health and nutrition (Skoufias, 2007). The program, which was renamed 
“Oportunidades” after the change of government in 2000, has finally achieved including 
over 5 million families in all Mexican states (Wood et al., 2009). In this chapter, the 
program will be designated as PROGRESA-Oportunidades. 
  In this chapter, the discussion will center upon how much 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades was able to reduce current poverty, measured by food 
consumption, through cash transfers. Levy (2006), the key figure in charge of designing 
and introducing PROGRESA-Oportunidades under the Zedillo administration, 
considers one of the major objectives of PROGRESA-Oportunidades to be the 
redistribution of income to families in extreme poverty by increasing their certainty of 
having a minimum level of consumption, together with the improvement of child 
schooling and poor families’ health and nutrition status. 
  Greater attention, however, has been devoted to aspects of reducing future poverty by 
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intervening children’s education and health and nutrition. Moreover, with respect to 
consumption aspects of PROGRESA-Oportunidades, almost all studies used data before 
2003 and have confirmed poverty improvement. Few studies have examined the issue of 
the poverty trend and the effects of PROGRESA-Oportunidades after 2003. 
  The Mexican economy, in fact, enjoyed stability and positive growth during the 7 
years from 2001 until the economic crisis caused by the Lehman shock in 2008. Poverty 
indices were also in a decreasing trend on a national level at least until 20061 despite 
the gradual increase of food prices. Did the poorest of the poor in marginal rural areas 
covered by PROGRESA-Oportunidades enjoy the same economic and social benefits as 
the reminder of the nation? The answer is no. The analyses of poverty trends of rural 
areas eligible for PROGRESA-Oportunidades during 2003–2007 in this chapter reveal 
the poverty degradation that occurred, as measured by food consumption, possibly 
because of food price increases. In addition, the regression results showed that the CCT 
cash transfers served only as a partial buffer against the drop of poor households’ 
consumption level. This would imply that CCTs alone would be insufficient to help 
poor people escape completely from poverty trap once they face any kind of unexpected 
shocks such as sudden food price increases.  
  In the next section, characteristics of PROGRESA-Oportunidades and its panel data 
created for the external evaluations will be explained briefly. Section 3-3 presents a 
literature review focusing on consumption effects of the CCT. In Section 3-4, the 
poverty trend in marginal rural areas during 2003–2007 is described. The section then 
specifically examines the impacts of food price increases on rural poverty and presents 
the degree to which the CCT program contributed as a buffer against price shocks. Next, 
an empirical analysis using panel data is conducted in Section 3-5 to confirm the impact 
                                                 
1 Data from World Development Indicators online and CONEVAL 
(http://www.coneval.gob.mx). However, it is difficult to determine exactly when the 
poverty trend reversed due to the absence of national household survey data for 2007.  
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of food price increases and the effects of CCT on poverty degradation during 2003－
2007. Section 3-6 concludes.  
 
3-2. Characteristics of PROGRESA-Oportunidades and its Panel Data  
  As described above, CCT programs were generally undertaken with two clear 
objectives. First, they provide poor households with a minimum consumption floor (to 
reduce “current” poverty). Second, in making transfers conditional, they encourage the 
accumulation of human capital to break a vicious cycle whereby poverty is transmitted 
across generations (to reduce future poverty) (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). With respect 
to the Mexican PROGRESA-Oportunidades, the education component is designed to 
increase school enrollment among youth in Mexico’s poor rural communities by making 
educational grants available to the pupils’ mothers, with the requirement that greater 
than 85 percent attendance be achieved.  In the area of health and nutrition, 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades includes distribution of nutritional supplements, education 
related to hygiene and nutrition, and monetary transfers for the purchase of food. 
Receipt of monetary transfers and nutritional supplements is tied to mandatory visits to 
public clinics for health care2. The average monthly payment (received every two 
months) by a beneficiary family amounts to 20 percent of the value of monthly 
consumption expenditures prior to the initiation of the program. One additional 
requirement of PROGRESA-Oportunidades is that households benefiting from the 
program were obligated to stop receiving benefits from other programs (Skoufias, 
2005).  
  The series of household panel data for the evaluation of PROGESA-Oportunidades is 
called Encuestas de Evaluación de los Hogares (ENCEL), which is designed and 
conducted periodically by the Social Development Secretary (Secretaría de Desarrollo 
                                                 
2
 This aspect of the program emphasizes targeting benefits to children under five, and 
pregnant and lactating women (Skoufias, 2005). 
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Social: SEDESOL) with the assistance of the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) for the purpose of the external evaluation of the program. A unique 
characteristic of the ENCEL is that the randomized experiment was implemented at the 
beginning of the program to evaluate the effects of the program accurately. The full 
sample of ENCEL consists of repeated observations collected for 24,000 households 
from 506 localities (villages) in the 7 states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Puebla, 
Querétaro, San Luis Potosí and Veracruz. Of those 506 localities, 320 localities were 
assigned to the treatment group (denominated as “Treatment 1998” herein), and 186 
localities were assigned as controls (denominated as “Treatment 2000” herein). The 
eligible households of the control localities could not receive benefits of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades until 2000 (Skoufias, 2007).  
An additional comparison group of 151 localities not yet incorporated into the 
program was selected as a new control group using the propensity score matching 
(PSM) for the seventh round of the survey in 2003 (denominated as “Control 2003” 
herein) (Todd, 2004). This group became entitled to receive benefits starting by 2004. In 
total, eight rounds of surveys were conducted in the most marginal rural areas by 2007, 
enabling researchers to make use of a long period of micro-panel data.  
  As described in this  chapter, we use rural samples of the two most recent rounds 
available, the years 2003 and 2007. 
 
3-3. Literature Review: Impacts of CCT and Food Price Increases on Poverty in 
Mexico 
  The literature that specifically describes the short-term purpose of alleviating present 
poverty––in other words, consumption––will be surveyed in this section. First, 
Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) and Hoddinott and Wiesmann (2008) studied whether 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades could have improved the diet of the rural poor in Mexico 
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or not using the first three rounds of ENCEL panel data in October 1998 (ENCEL98O), 
May-June 1999 (ENCEL99M) and November 1999 (ENCEL99N). Both studies 
revealed that the program beneficiaries increased caloric intake compared to their 
counterparts in the control villages. They also showed that the impact of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades was greater on the improvement of dietary quality: the 
acquisition of calories from fruits, vegetables, and meats.  
  Skoufias and di Maro (2008) and Fiszbein and Schady (2009) analyzed the impact of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades on poverty reduction using ENCEL98O, ENCEL99M and 
ENCEL99N. Both analyses showed a substantial reduction in poverty as measured by 
The Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) indices (Foster et al., 1984) for those participating 
in the program. Skoufias and di Maro (2008) reported that the poverty reduction effects 
were stronger for the poverty gap and the severity of poverty measures3.  
  Skoufias (2007) conducted an empirical analysis of the risk insurance model using 
three rounds of ENCEL panel data of 1998–1999. The effect of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades on the improvement of the pre-existing risk sharing within 
villages was not statistically significant, but the analysis results revealed that receiving 
benefits of PROGRESA-Oportunidades enables households to insulate their 
consumption from idiosyncratic income shocks better than their counterparts. In 
addition, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2006; 2009) confirmed the indirect effect, or 
“spillover effect” of PROGRESA-Oportunidades cash transfers to increase the 
consumption of ineligible households living in the same treatment village.  
  Gertler et al. (2012) discussed the investment effect on welfare using ENCEL data for 
1998–2003 and results of a baseline survey (ENCASEH) of 1997. Their estimates show 
that households consume about three-quarters of the transfer and invest the rest. Some 
                                                 
3
 Skoufias and di Maro (2008) also studied the relation between 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades and adult work incentives, concluding that no evidence 
exists to show that the program affected adult participation in the labor market and 
overall adult leisure time. 
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studies, such as Angelucci and Attanasio (2009) and Krishnakumar and Chávez Juárez 
(2010), show that PROGRESA-Oportunidades has reduced poverty in urban areas.  
All literature on consumption by 2003 has revealed a significant positive effect of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades on poverty. It is notable that the data used in the literature 
are mostly those for 1998–1999, when the ideal randomized experiment to compare the 
program effects had been conducted. Some of the literature specifically describes a 
longer period extending to 2003, but only two reports (Arroyo et al., 2008; Attanasio et 
al., 2009) use data extending to 2007, the latest data available today.  
Arroyo et al. (2008) analyzed the long-term effects of PROGRESA-Oportunidades on 
the consumption of the benefited households as well as on their decision-making for 
investment and saving using ENCEL 2007. They concluded, with respect to 
consumption, that households with longer exposure to the program tend to have greater 
per-capita consumption level than those with shorter exposure. However, they use only 
one year data for 2007 and did not take into account the price effects that stated to affect 
poor households in this period.  
Attanasio et al. (2009) simulated the welfare consequences of the recent increases in 
food prices in Mexico and Colombia using CCT panel data. They showed that CCT 
programs provide better means of alleviating the problem of increasing staple prices 
than other indirect policies, computing the effects of 50 peso transfer and 5 percent 
price subsidy. This is the only analysis of Mexican food price increases and poverty that 
has used ENCEL data to date. They, however, completely dropped the “Control 2003” 
samples. Moreover, it would be necessary to examine the validity of their assumption by 
other estimation methods. 
  Several other studies, Valero-Gil and Valero (2008) and Wood et al. (2009) have 
examined the impacts of the food price increases on poverty in Mexico using the 
National Income and Expenditure Survey of Households (ENIGH) for 2006. Both of 
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them found a negative impact of the price change on the welfare of poor households. 
These studies also refer to CCT, but only in a complementary manner4.  
As described above, few studies have examined the longer-term effects of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades despite the availability of the updated data after 2000. 
More studies must particularly address the recent effects of the CCT on consumption 
and poverty by using data for 2007, which can also account for the important macro 
shock caused by commodity price increases.  
 
3-4. Poverty Trend in Rural Mexico and Food Price Increases: 2003-2007 
3-4-1. Poverty Trend in Rural Mexico 
  In this section, we examine the poverty trend of the most marginal areas of rural 
Mexico during 2003–2007 using household samples of the ENCEL data described 
above. The FGT poverty indices (Foster et al., 1984)––the most popular indices in 
measuring poverty––are used. The FGT indices are defined as 
   �∝ = ଵ௡∑ ቀͳ − ���� ቁ∝��=ଵ ,     (3.1) 
where ݍ  represents the number of individuals �  whose consumption at time � , 
denoted by ܿ��, is below a certain level of poverty line �. Also, � represents the total 
population. When ∝= Ͳ, ͳ, or 2, �଴, �ଵ, or �ଶ respectively represents “Poverty head 
count ratio”, “Poverty gap ratio” and “Squared poverty gap ratio”.  
  In this paper, per-capita weekly food consumption of each household, which is the 
sum of monetary expenditures and self-consumption, will be used to estimate the FGT 
indices5. The official rural food basket (canasta básica alimentaria rural) published by 
                                                 
4
 Wood et al. (2009) only use the information to distinguish the poor from the non-poor. 
Valero-Gil and Valero (2008), in contrast, consider the buffer effect of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades to the price shocks with another public policy for prices. 
However, their argument addresses neither the consumption of each household nor that 
of rural poor, but only focuses on the aggregated poverty ratio. 
5
 To calculate per-capita consumption, we first construct each household’s weekly food 
consumption by summing up the reported amount of weekly food consumption and the 
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the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social: CONEVAL) is used as the 
poverty line. Both the per-capita food consumption and the poverty line are deflated by 
the state-level food CPI6. 
  Table 3-1 presents the changes in the three types of FGT indices during 2003–2007. 
Indices were calculated using the overall sample as well as using three sub-samples: the 
original treatment groups (villages) in which the eligible households started receiving 
benefits in 1998, denominated as “Treatment 1998”, the original control villages 
receiving benefits since 2000 (Treatment 2000), and the new control villages, which 
were integrated in the ENCEL in 2003 and which started receiving benefits by 2004 
(Control 2003).  
  The striking result of Table 1 presents that poverty worsened (rose) in all three 
different types of indices as well as in all three sub-samples with different periods of 
program exposure. The poverty head count ratio increased 2 percentage points in overall 
(from 94 percent to 96 percent), in “Treatment 2000” (from 95 percent to 97 percent), 
and in “Control 2003” (from 91 percent to 93 percent), and 3 percentage points in 
“Treatment 1998” (from 94 percent to 97 percent)7. The poverty gap ratio, which 
indicates the depth of poverty, also worsened by 7 percentage points (from 0.55 to 0.62) 
in overall and by 5–8 percentage points in the sub-samples. The squared poverty gap 
ratio, which represents the severity of poverty, rose markedly. Aggravation of the 
poverty gap ratio and the squared poverty gap ratio confirms that the distribution among 
                                                                                                                                               
estimated weekly self-consumption. Then we divide the household’s weekly food 
consumption by the number of household members to ascertain the per-capita weekly 
food consumption. In estimating the amount of self-consumption, we first calculate the 
median state price of each item using each household’s reported amounts of weekly 
purchase and the expenditure on the item. Then we multiply the amount of reported 
self-consumption by the estimated unit median price of the state.  
6
 Banco de México Estadísticas: http://www.banxico.org.mx/estadisticas/index.html 
7
 The high percentage of poverty head count ratio depends on the fact that the ENCEL 
sample villages are chosen from the most marginal rural areas throughout the country.  
81 
 
the poor also worsened, which means that the poorest of the poor became much poorer 
than the rest.  
 
 
 
  The level of poverty indices of “Control 2003” is modest compared to the other two 
treatment groups in 2003 and 2007, which suggests that the profile of the “Control 2003” 
should be different (less poor) even though this group was added to serve as a new 
control for the original samples. Furthermore, the magnitude of changes in FGT indices 
is less in the poverty gap and squared poverty gap ratios in the case of “Control 2003”, 
which confirms again the hypothesis that the most vulnerable households, which are 
most easily affected by unexpected shocks, should be the poorest of the poor.  
 
3-4-2. Food Price Increases in Mexico 
  A continuous rise in food prices has been observed during 2003–2007 in Mexico. 
Figure 3-1 presents the trends of general and food CPIs at the national level. It is 
apparent that the food CPI growth has been larger than the general CPI. In fact, the 
proportion of the food CPI relative to the general CPI rises from 0.88 as of January 
2003 to 0.94 as of December 2007.  
 
2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007
Headcount ratio 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.93
Poverty gap ratio 0.55 0.62 0.56 0.64 0.57 0.64 0.49 0.54
Squared poverty gap ratio 0.37 0.44 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.46 0.31 0.36
Number of obs 18,924 18,924 9,012 9,012 6,285 6,285 3,627 3,627
Source: Author's calculation based on ENCEL2003 and 2007.
Table 3-1. Changes in FGT Indices (Per-Capita Food Consumption), 2003–2007
Poverty Indices Overall Sample Treatment 1998 Treatment 2000 Control 2003
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  This phenomenon presumably occurred in correspondence to the food price increases 
in the international market, especially those of soy beans and cereals such as corn, 
wheat, and rice. Figure 3-2 shows the monthly international food and cereal price 
indices. It is clear that the international food price increase has been caused by the price 
rise in cereals. The main reason for this unusual price increase is the high demand for 
biofuels (Valero-Gil and Valero, 2008). Since Mexico has fully liberalized the import of 
maize, its principal grain, its domestic price is determined fundamentally by the same 
mechanism as that of the United States (Tani, 2012). In fact, Mexico imports one-third 
of its domestic consumption (Tani, 2012) 8, almost all of it from the United States. 
 
                                                 
8
 Mexico imports only yellow maize for industrial processes and cattle feed. Domestic 
production of white maize for tortillas satisfies the national demand (Tani, 2012).  
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Figure 3-3 shows both the domestic wholesale price9 and the international price of 
maize. It is noteworthy that the domestic price follows the international price trend. The 
wholesale price of maize in Mexico City rose by 1.3 times during 2003–2007 from 2.46 
pesos per kilo to 3.21 pesos (annual average) while its international price increased by 
more than 1.5 times during the same period10.  
The impacts of food price increases on the rural poverty in Mexico and the CCT 
effects will be discussed in detail in the next sub-sections.  
 
                                                 
9
 Wholesale prices of Mexico City are used because of the limit of data availability. 
Only prices in Mexico City, Guadalajara (second biggest city) and Puebla (one of the 
ENCEL pilot state near Mexico City) are available. We should note that the price trends 
of these three cities turned out to be very similar throughout the period. Wood et al. 
(2009) also conclude that there is little regional variation in the change in tortilla prices. 
10
 With respect to other major Mexican staples, rice prices also increased during the 
same period, but black bean prices were maintained until 2008.  
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3-4-3. Impacts of Food Price Increases on Rural Poverty and the Effects of CCT  
3-4-3-1. Impacts of Food Price Increases on Rural Poverty 
  Figure 3-4 shows the kernel densities of per-capita real food consumption in 2003 
and 2007. To ascertain the different impacts of the food price increases in this period, 
the sample is divided into two groups: households with self-consumption in 2007 (Fig. 
4A) and those without self-consumption (Fig. 4B). Having self-consumption or not is 
used as an indicator of the impact of food price increases because: (i) farmers are widely 
known, if they rationally respond to the market signals, to increase their agricultural 
production when the food price rises; (ii) poor farmers, who are the principal target of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades, are mostly engaged in maize cultivation for their daily 
consumption of tortillas11; and (iii) the estimates of the per-capita consumption used for 
this study have taken into account the level of self-consumption as a part of each 
                                                 
11
 About 60 percent of the sample households cultivated lands whose median surface is 
2 ha. and 90 percent of them are rain-fed in 2003. 
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household’s food consumption. Consequently, having self-consumption or not is 
expected to directly reflect the influence of food price increases, especially that of maize. 
The self-consumption dummy will be utilized hereafter as a proxy for the food price 
increase to measure its impact. 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENCEL 2003, 2007. 
Figure 3-4. Kernel Density of per-capita Food Consumption 
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  The figure shows that the overall food consumption level of households without 
self-consumption decreased in 2007 compared to that of 2003 (the distribution shifts to 
the left in Fig. 4B), whereas households having self-consumption in 2007 maintain their 
food consumption level despite the food price increases in Fig. 4A. When comparing 
the averages of real per-capita food consumption, households having self-consumption 
in 2007 increased their weekly per-capita food consumption by 7.7 percent from 87.5 
pesos (on average) in 2003 to 94.2 pesos (on average) in 2007. The weekly per-capita 
consumption of those without self-consumption in 2007 reduced by 25.5 percent from 
95.7 pesos (on average) to 71.3 pesos (on average).  
  In the next subsection, the discussion is focused on whether the cash transfers by 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades can prevent households from falling into a poorer situation 
by lowering their consumption level.  
 
3-4-3-2. Buffer Effects of the CCT on Poverty Degradation 
  In Figure 3-5, only households without self-consumption in 2007, who are supposed 
to have been affected by price increases, are selected to divide them into two groups: 
those receiving cash transfers from PROGRESA-Oportunidades in 2007 (Fig. 5A) and 
those without benefits (Fig. 5B). As the figure shows, the shift of distribution to the left 
is smaller for the benefitted households, which means that the consumption level of 
benefited households falls less. When comparing the average weekly per-capita 
consumption of each group, that of benefitted households fell by 11.3 percent from 84.0 
pesos (on average) in 2003 to 66.3 pesos (on average) in 2007. In contrast, the average 
consumption of households not receiving benefits fell by as many as 32.2 percent from 
121.8 pesos in 2003 to 82.4 pesos in 2007.  
 In sum, one can infer that cash transfers by PROGRESA-Oportunidades had partial 
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(not complete) consumption smoothing effects when facing the unexpected food price 
increases. Empirical analyses will be conducted in the next sub-section to confirm 
statistically the robustness of this inference.  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ENCEL 2003, 2007. 
Figure 3-5. Kernel Density of per-capita Food Consumption  
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3-5. Empirical Analysis 
3-5-1. Methods 
  The model for the panel to be estimated is the following: ܿ�� =∝ +����ݎ଴7 +  ܤ���݂��଴7 +  ܵ�� ଴݂7 + �� + ߳��,  
                  � = ͳ, … ,�, � = ͳ,… , �, ߳��~�� ሺͲ, �ଶሻ          (3.2) ܿ�� =∝ +�ଵ���ݎ଴7 + �ଶ ଶ଴଴଴ ∙ ���ݎ଴7 + �ଷ ଶ଴଴ଷ ∙ ���ݎ଴7 + ܤ���݂��଴7 +  ܵ�� ଴݂7 + �� + ߳��,                   (3.2)͛ 
             ܿ�� =∝ +����ݎ଴7 +  ܤ���݂��଴7 +  ܵ�� ଴݂7 
  +� ଶ଴଴ଷሺ����ݎ଴7 +  ܤ���݂��଴7 +  ܵ�� ଴݂7ሻ + �� + ߳��,  (3.2)͜ 
where ܿ�� represents real per-capita food consumption of household � in time �. The 
reminder of the independent variables are all dummies that take 1 if � = ʹ (���ݎ଴7), if 
household �  receives a cash transfer from PROGRESA-Oportunidades in 2007 
(ܤ���݂��଴7 ) and if household �  has self-consumption in 2007 (ܵ�� ଴݂7 ). ��  is a 
time-invariant idiosyncratic (household specific) error term and ߳�� , the reminder 
disturbance of mean zero and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). In addition, 
interaction terms of different treatment/control groups  (“Treatment 2000” and 
“Control 2003”),  , with ���ݎ଴7 , ܤ���݂��଴7  or ܵ�� ଴݂7  are used to control the 
group-specific effects that must be attributed to the difference of the years receiving 
benefits and their profiles as indicated in equations (3.2)͛and  (3.2)͜.  
The parameters of this model can provide average effects of the price shock and of 
the CCT to the households’ consumption level. The price shock is explained by the ���ݎ଴7 dummy as a macro shock to all households that happened during 2003–2007, 
and by the ܵ�� ଴݂7 dummy for the reasons discussed above. Furthermore, the merit of 
this model is that we can control the time-invariant idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
households to extract common effects of food price increases and of CCT cash transfers.  
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3-5-2. Results 
  Table 3-2 presents the summary statistics of the variables to be used in the analysis. 
Only 8 percent of the households practice self-consumption. 69 percent of the sample 
received cash transfer of PROGRESA-Oportunidades, which is consistent with the other 
reports of the literature. “Treatment 1998”, “Treatment 2000” and “Control 2003” 
respectively account for 47 percent, 33 percent and 19 percent12.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Only the households of which the ID matched in both years were selected. 
Households that did not report their expenditures were also dropped from the sample.  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
overall 4.04 0.74 -2.08 9.68 N =   37515
between 0.60 0.62 7.71 n =   18774
within 0.44 0.94 7.14 T-bar = 1.99824
overall 0.50 0.50 0 1  N =   37530
between 0.02 0 1 n =   18781
within 0.50 0.00 1.00 T-bar =  1.9983
overall 0.08 0.27 0 1  N =   37530
between 0.27 0 1 n =   18781
within 0.00 0.08 0.08  T-bar =  1.9983
overall 0.69 0.46 0 1 N =   37530
between 0.46 0 1  n =   18781
within 0.01 0.19 1.19 T-bar =  1.9983
overall 0.47 0.50 0 1 N =   37530
between 0.50 0 1 n =   18781
within 0.00 0.47 0.47 T-bar =  1.9983
overall 0.33 0.47 0 1   N =   37530
between 0.47 0 1  n =   18781
within 0.00 0.33 0.33 T-bar =  1.9983
overall 0.19 0.39 0 1  N =   37530
between 0.39 0 1 n =   18781
within 0.00 0.19 0.19  T-bar =  1.9983
Source: ENCEL 2003, 2007.
Treatment 1998
(dummy)
Treatment 2000
(dummy)
Control 2003
(dummy)
Table 3-2. Summary Statistics
Variable
log of weekly real
per-capita food
consumption
year dummy
(2007=1)
self-consumption in
2007 (dummy)
receving cash
transfer from
PROGRESA in 2007
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  Table 3-3 presents the regression results. Model 1 shows that the consumption 
dropped by about 21 percent on average in 2007 compared to the 2003 level. Receiving 
benefits in 2007 increases consumption level by about 10–11 percent on average 
(Models 2, 4, 6, 7), whereas having self-consumption in 2007 increases consumption by 
about 22–23 percent (Models 3, 4, 6, 7). When controlling ܤ���݂��଴7, the magnitude 
of coefficients of ���ݎ଴7rises by about 10 percentage points, which means that the 
consumption level would drop by about 30 percent on average if a household received 
no benefits nor practiced self-consumption in 2007 (Models 4, 6, 7).  
  With respect to the group dummies, only “Control 2003” interacted with ���ݎ଴7 is 
statistically significant (Models 5 and 6), which implies that “Control 2003” has a 
different profile from the other two groups as discussed in the preceding section. It is 
particularly interesting, however, that neither of the interaction terms of the “Control 
2003” dummy and ܤ���݂��଴7 or ܵ�� ଴݂7 become statistically significant (Model 7), 
which implies that the effects of cash transfers or of self-consumption are independent 
of the factors inherent in any of the treatment/control groups.  
  Table 3-4 presents regression results of household samples without self-consumption 
to illustrate the buffer effects of cash transfers of PROGRESA-Oportunidades more 
accurately. Model 1, with only the year dummy, shows that the households without 
self-consumption in 2007 decreased their consumption level by about 23 percent on 
average. The decrease, however, worsens to 30–32 percent when the ܤ���݂��଴7 
dummy is included (Models 2 and 4), which implies that the consumption level will 
drop by more than 30 percent if the households have neither self-consumption nor 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades benefits. Cash transfers of PROGRESA-Oportunidades 
offset one-third of the total drop in eligible households’ food consumption on average 
(-0.3+0.1 in Model 2).  
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-0.227 -0.227 -0.301 -0.245 -0.330
(-35.15)*** (-35.14)*** (-25.99)*** (-26.07)*** (-18.82)***
0.003 0.007
(0.18) (0.25)
0.087 0.098
(4.99)*** (3.49)***
0.107 0.120
(7.69)*** (5.76)***
-0.009
(-0.26)
0.012
(0.34)
4.146 4.146 4.146 4.146 4.146
(907.97)*** (740.50)*** (909.50)*** (908.65)*** (910.48)***
Number of obs 34527 34527 34527 34527 34527
R-sq:  within 0.0669 0.0669 0.0700 0.0684 0.0723
              between 0.0000 0.0000 0.0321 0.0223 0.003
            overall 0.0232 0.0232 0.0148 0.0292 0.020
F test F=2.08  - F=2.00 F=2.05 F=1.99
Prob>F 0.000  - 0.000 0.000 0.000
Breusch and Pagan
test
 - chi2(1)=1939.25  -  -  -
Prob>chi2  - 0.000  -  -  -
Hausman test chi2(2)=608.94 chi2(3)=190.93 chi2(6)=756.80
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
a: Random effects model is also shown when Hausman specification test adopts the model. 
Source: ENCEL 2003, 2007. 
Constant
chi2(1)=0.83
0.3632
Note: t statistics (for fixed effects model) or z statistics (for random effects model) are in parentheses.
***, **, * are significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent.
year 2007
year 2007 *
Treatment 2000
year 2007 *
Control 2003
benefit in 2007
benefit 2007 *
Treatment 2000
benefit 2007 *
Control 2003
Table 3-4. Regression Results of Panel data
 (Households without self-consumption in 2007)
Dependent Variable: Log of weekly real per-capita food consumption 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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  The interaction terms of treatment/control group dummies with ���ݎ଴7  or ܤ���݂��଴7 are included in models 3 and 4, respectively, to control the length of 
exposure to the program and the different profiles of respective groups. As in Table 3, 
only the interaction term of ���ݎ଴7 and “Control 2003” is positive and significant, 
which implies that no significant difference of length or profiles exists between 
“Treatment 1998” and “Treatment 2000”, but the “Control 2003” households’ decrease 
in consumption is slightly smaller than the original two groups because of their different 
profiles (not so poor as their counterparts). The statistical insignificance of the 
interaction terms of treatment/control groups dummies and ܤ���݂��଴7  for both 
“Treatment 2000” and “Control 2003” indicates that the buffer effects of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades against the food price increases is the same among all 
groups (Model 4).  
 
3-6. Concluding Remarks 
  As described in this chapter, the discussion emphasized the impacts of the food price 
increases on the poverty degradation in rural Mexico prevailing during 2003–2007, 
particularly addressing the buffer effects of CCT against the macro shock. Results 
present strong evidence that the substantial drop of food consumption level during 
2003–2007 should be attributed to the domestic food price increases caused by 
international price changes (especially for maize). In addition, the empirical analysis 
confirmed the positive effects of PROGRESA-Oportunidades (especially through cash 
transfers) but the effects were insufficient to compensate the entire loss of consumption, 
compared to the roles played by self-consumption. 
  Finally, the empirical results of this study imply that CCTs should not be overvalued, 
given that the program cannot fully cope with poverty degradation, particularly in case 
of external shocks. Kurosaki (2009) argues that poor households are vulnerable to risk 
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in the sense that they fall into a severer poverty trap once they encounter any 
unexpected external shocks, which might cancel out the longer-term effects of the 
program that have been promoted by the investment in education and health. Additional 
policy measures, including flexible in-kind benefits13, should be strongly required to 
compensate these plausible losses whenever an unexpected event occurs. 
  The shortcoming of this chapter, however, is that variables such as income and price, 
which are other important factors in determining the consumption level, were not 
considered directly in the regression models because of the complexity of the data. This 
remains for a future study. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this analysis cannot 
incorporate consideration of the recent economic crisis caused by the Lehman shock 
because of limited data availability. In addition, the steep rise of food prices had just 
begun in this period. Peaks were found in 2008 and in 2011. It is likely that the poverty 
circumstances of these households would have worsened even more severely after 2007. 
We must continue to observe, using new data, the poverty trends and the roles of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades amid the severe economic situation.   
 
 
                                                 
13
 In 2007, PROGRESA-Oportunidades added to their grant 50 pesos per month which 
were labeled as a subsidy for energy consumption. (Attanasio et al., 2009) 
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Chapter 4 
 
Consumption Smoothing and Vulnerability 
in Rural Mexico 
 
 
4-1. Introduction 
  It is widely known that people living in the rural areas of poor countries must often 
cope not only with severe poverty but also with extremely variable incomes. They face 
many risks that fluctuate their incomes, such as natural disasters, illness, injury, 
involuntary unemployment and market price changes, and they are often hardly insured 
against these risks. Income fluctuations can present an acute threat to people’s 
livelihoods even if, on average, incomes are high enough to maintain a minimal 
standard of living (Bardhan and Udry, 1999).  
The term vulnerability is used rather loosely in economics and other disciplines 
(Dercon, 2005). One could define vulnerable households as those likely to fall below an 
agreed upon poverty line in the future with a particular probability. Some non-poor 
household could be classified as vulnerable to poverty, whereas some poor households 
could be classified as not vulnerable to poverty in the future. These measures can be 
referred to as expected poverty measures. An alternative way of expressing vulnerability 
is closely linked to standard expected utility approaches. Vulnerability is then the 
welfare cost related to the sum of the welfare loss from deviations of mean consumption 
relative to an agreed level (the cost of poverty) plus a measure of the cost of risk—the 
difference of expected utility from the utility related to expected consumption. Its key 
advantage is its direct link of expected poverty with standard economic theory related to 
the behavior toward risk (Dercon, 2005).  
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The theory of expected utility tells us that the expected utility of risk-averse 
individuals falls as the variability of consumption rises. If we knew the utility functions 
and expected consumption patterns of all individuals, we could then analyze poverty in 
terms of certainty-equivalent consumption (the consumption which, if unvarying, would 
yield an equivalent level of expected utility as a household’s actual―higher mean but 
more variable―consumption levels) (Kamanou and Morduch, 2005). 
Kamanou and Morduch (2005) argued that the vulnerability of a population is the 
product of three elements: (1) the pattern of possible shocks, or losses, because of the 
loss of a job or a bad harvest; (2) the strength of coping mechanisms, or the degree to 
which provisions are not in place to fully address shocks; and (3) structural and 
behavioral ramifications of consumption declines: whether such declines would just 
cause temporally shortfalls for households or lead them to fall into poverty traps? 
  The main obstacles to consumption smoothing are the liquidity constraints caused by 
the market imperfection in rural areas. Bardhan and Udry (1999) argue that liquidity 
constraints are more likely to be binding particularly among poor farmers, so that 
(agricultural) production and consumption cannot be financed from savings, and the 
costs (in terms of utility, health and even survival) of fluctuations in an already low 
level of consumption are extreme. The poor farmers need to consume before harvest, 
which depends on climate and many other external factors. Thus, when production is 
risky and insurance markets are incomplete, credit transactions play a valuable role by 
permitting people to smooth consumption in the face of a randomly fluctuating stream 
of income. 
  The inexistence or poor functioning of formal credit and/or insurance markets in rural 
areas are supplemented by a variety of informal mechanisms. Dercon (2005) describes 
two strategies such households exposed to income fluctuations use to reduce the 
impacts of shocks: risk-management strategies and risk-coping strategies. 
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Risk-management strategies attempt to reduce the riskiness of the income process ex 
ante (income smoothing) through, in most cases, diversification of income sources by 
combining different income generating activities, including cultivation of various crops 
to reduce the harvest risk, even if the crops have a lower average yield. On the other 
hand, Risk-coping strategies include self-insurance (through precautionary savings) and 
informal group-based risk sharing. They deal with the consequences of income risk 
(consumption smoothing). Households can insure themselves by building up assets in 
good years, which they can deplete in bad years. Also, informal arrangements can be 
made among members of a group or village to support each other in case of hardship, 
for example, among extended families, ethnic groups or neighborhoods (Dercon, 2005).  
  There is growing interest in the empirical analysis of informal risk sharing and in 
modeling the sustainability and consequences of the arrangements listed above. The 
most frequently cited study on risk sharing is by Townsend (1994) who uses ten-year 
panel data on three high-risk villages in the semi-arid tropics of southern India1. 
Townsend (1994) states that the aim of his study is to pose a simple question: How good 
or how bad are the institutions that might insure people in villages in southern India 
against the risks they face, such as erratic rainfall, crop and human diseases, and severe 
income fluctuations? He points out that there were many studies examining the possible 
risk-management/coping mechanisms one by one, such as crop/land diversifications, 
grain storage, purchases or sales of land or livestock, informal borrowing, or gifts and 
transfers in family networks. However, in studying only one market or institution, the 
researcher might miss smoothing possibilities provided by another. His study presents a 
general equilibrium framework that overcomes the problem of looking at risk sharing 
markets or institutions one at a time. Specifically, using the general equilibrium model 
inevitably leads the researcher to focus on outcomes, namely, consumption and labor 
                                                 
1
 The Indian panel data, known as ICRISAT data, is named after the institution that 
conducted the survey: the International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics.  
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supply2, so that all actual institutions of any kind are jointly evaluated. 
  In this study, an empirical analysis of risk-sharing mechanisms in rural Mexico is 
conducted to discuss the vulnerability of the rural poor using the most recent two 
periods of Mexican rural household panel data, in 2003 and 2007. In this study, 
vulnerability is considered the inability to smooth consumption because of liquidity 
constraints. First, we estimate a basic risk-sharing model defined by Townsend (1994) 
to examine how the risk-sharing mechanism works in rural Mexico. Then, we extend 
the model to focus on the welfare loss caused by negative shocks. We consider the 
effects of Mexico’s widely known poverty reduction program: the Conditional Cash 
Transfer (CCT) program, continuously within the risk-sharing framework. CCT 
programs, which are implemented in many developing countries in the world as a new 
targeting poverty reduction strategy, were generally undertaken with two clear 
objectives. First, they provide poor households with a minimum consumption floor (to 
reduce current poverty). Second, in making transfers conditional, they encourage the 
accumulation of human capital to break a vicious cycle whereby poverty is transmitted 
across generations (to reduce future poverty) (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). Whether 
CCT can enhance the risk-sharing mechanism corresponds to the first objective (to 
reduce current poverty).  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: The next section describes the rural 
households in the sample. A standard risk-sharing model is presented in Section 4-3. 
Empirical analyses are conducted in Section 4-4 with three different specifications: a 
basic risk-sharing model, a model that focuses specifically on negative income shocks 
to measure vulnerability more accurately; and a model that includes the effects of CCT. 
Section 4-5 concludes.  
. 
                                                 
2
 We assume the separability of consumption and labor supply in this study, and do not 
deal with labor supply.  
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4-2. Description of Panel Data 
  The series of household panel data used in this study is called Encuestas de 
Evaluación de los Hogares (ENCEL), or Household Evaluation Surveys, which is 
designed and conducted periodically by the Social Development Secretary (Secretaría 
de Desarrollo Social: SEDESOL) assisted by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) for the purpose of the external evaluation of the CCT program. Nine 
rounds of rural household panel data are available to date from 1997 to 2007, including 
a baseline survey in 1997. A unique characteristic of the ENCEL is that the randomized 
experiment was implemented at the beginning of the program to evaluate the effects of 
the program accurately. The full sample of ENCEL consists of repeated observations 
collected for 24,000 households from 506 localities (villages) in the 7 states of Guerrero, 
Hidalgo, Michoacán, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí and Veracruz. Of those 506 
localities, 320 localities were assigned to the treatment group (denominated as 
“Treatment 1998” herein), and 186 localities were assigned as controls (denominated as 
“Treatment 2000” herein). The eligible households of the control localities could not 
receive PROGRESA-Oportunidades benefits until 2000 (Skoufias, 2007).  
An additional comparison group of 151 localities not yet incorporated into the 
program was selected as a new control group using propensity score matching (PSM) 
for the seventh round of the survey in 2003 (denominated as “Control 2003” herein) 
(Todd, 2004). They became entitled to receive benefits through 2004. In total, eight 
rounds of surveys were conducted in the most marginal rural areas by 2007, which 
enables researchers to make use of a long period of micro-panel data.  
  We use rural samples of the two most recent rounds available: the years 2003 and 
2007. ENCEL 2003 consists of 33,887 households and 205,306 individuals. ENCEL 
2007 consists of 25,899 households and 176,809 individuals living in the seven sample 
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states3. When we drop households whose consumption is unreported or reported as nil, 
18,942 households remain as a complete panel dataset in the case of food consumption, 
and 17,603 households in the case of total consumption. 
 
4-3. Risk-Sharing Model4 
4-3-1. General Model 
We first examine a village economy in which the Pareto-efficient allocation of risk is 
achieved, but in which there is no access to credit markets or even to storage. Let � = ͳ, … ,� index the households that live in the village. There are � periods, indexed 
by �. Also ݏ indexes the ܵ states of nature, each with the objective and commonly 
known probability of occurrence ߨௌ, In state ݏ, each household � receives an income 
of ݕ�௦ > Ͳ5. Let ܿ�௦� represent household �’s consumption if state ݏ occurs in period �. Suppose that each household has a separable utility function of the form:  
�ܷ = ∑ ���்=ଵ ∑ ߨௌௌ௦=ଵ ݑ�ሺܿ�௦�ሻ ,     (4.1) 
where �� is a discount factor. ݑሺ ∙  ሻ is twice continuously differentiable with ݑ′ > Ͳ , ݑ′′ < Ͳ  and lim�→଴ ݑ′ ሺ�ሻ = +∞. A Pareto-efficient allocation of risk within 
the village can be found by maximizing the weighted sum of utilities of each of the � 
households, where the weight of household � in the Pareto program is ߣ�,  Ͳ < ߣ� <ͳ, ∑ߣ� = ͳ: max��ೞ� ∑ ߣ� �ܷ��=ଵ  ,     (4.2) 
subject to the resources available in the village at each point in time in each state of 
nature: 
                                                 
3
 ENCEL 2007 also includes new samples of 18,052 households and 77,768 individuals 
extracted from the original 7 states as well as from some other poor states. They are 
excluded from the panel data because they are cross-sectional and their profiles are very 
different from those of ENCEL 2003. 
4
 This section mainly relies on Bardhan and Udry (1999: Ch.8) and Kurosaki (2001: 
Ch.8; 2006a; 2009: Ch.9). 
5
 Here we assume that income is exogenous.  
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∑ ܿ�௦���=ଵ ൑ ∑ ݕ�௦���=ଵ    ∀ݏ, �.    (4.3) ܿ�௦� ൒ Ͳ.   ∀ݏ, �     (4.4) 
Equation (4.3) is the set of village resource constraints. Equation (4.4) contains the 
non-negativity constraints, which do not bind if the village has any resources in each 
period along each possible history. 
  The first-order conditions corresponding to ܿ�௦� and ௝ܿ௦� imply 
௨�′ሺ��ೞ�ሻ௨ೕ′(�ೕೞ�) = ఒೕఒ�       ∀�, ݆, ݏ, �.        (4.5) 
This equality extends across all � households in the village in any state at any point in 
time. The marginal utilities and, therefore, consumption levels of all households in the 
village move together. This implies that the consumption of any household is a 
monotonically increasing function of average village consumption. In a Pareto-efficient 
allocation, then, transient changes in income are fully pooled at the community level. 
The only risk faced by the household is that faced by the community as a whole.  
  To see this result in its stark form, suppose that everyone in the village has an 
identical constant absolute risk aversion utility function, so that ݑ�ሺܿ�ሻ = −ሺͳ �⁄ ሻ�−���. 
Applying this utility function to the first-order condition (5) and taking logs, we find ܿ�௦� = ௝ܿ௦� + ሺͳ �⁄ ሻ(lnሺߣ�ሻ − ln(ߣ௝)) ,    (4.6) 
As before, this equality holds across all � households in the village at any point in 
time. If we sum across these � equalities, ܿ�௦� = ܿ௦̅� + ଵ� ቀlnሺߣ�ሻ − ଵ�∑ ln(ߣ௝)�௝=ଵ ቁ,   (4.7) 
where           ܿ௦̅� = ଵ�∑ ௝ܿ௦��௝=ଵ    
Therefore, household consumption is equal to the average level of consumption in the 
village plus a time-invariant household fixed effect that depends on the relative weight 
of the household in the Pareto program. Equation (4.7) implies that the change in a 
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household’s consumption between any two periods is equal to the change in average 
community consumption between the two periods. After controlling for average 
consumption, a household’s consumption is unaffected by its own income. In a 
Pareto-efficient allocation of risk within a community, households face only aggregate 
risk. Idiosyncratic income shocks are completely insured within the community.  
From the second welfare theorem, we know that the Pareto-efficient allocation of risk 
can be supported by a competitive equilibrium with complete contingent markets. 
However, it is implausible that such a rich set of competitive markets exists. Any 
risk-pooling mechanism must overcome the information and enforcement problems 
associated with insurance contracts. In the presence of these problems, a complete set of 
markets will not exist and the competitive equilibrium will not be Pareto-efficient. 
However, efficient (or nearly efficient) risk-pooling could be supported by a variety of 
other mechanisms such as interlinkages and repeated personalized transactions between 
households, which are usually observed at community levels in developing countries, as 
many studies have pointed out.  
  The existence of ex post risk-pooling mechanisms within a variety of communities in 
less developed countries suggests that some communities may have developed 
insurance systems that allocate risk to approach Pareto efficiency. This line of reasoning 
has motivated a number of quantitative studies of risk sharing. For example, Townsend 
(1994) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) examine consumption outcomes rather than 
specific risk-pooling mechanisms in the ICRISAT Indian study villages6. There is a high 
degree of co-movement in consumption across households within this set of villages, 
despite the fact that there is a substantial amount of idiosyncratic income variation. 
                                                 
6
 Other representative empirical studies on risk sharing are Deaton (1992) and Grimard 
(1997) in Côte d’Ivoire, Udry (1994) on rural credit market in Nigeria, and Amin et al. 
(2003) on microfinance in Bangladesh. All of them rejected the full risk sharing 
hypothesis. See also Bardhan and Udry (1999: Ch.8) and Kamanou and Morduch 
(2005) for a detailed literature review on empirical studies of risk sharing.  
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Nevertheless, a fully Pareto-efficient allocation of risk is not achieved in these villages. 
 
4-3-2. Empirical Model 
  A reduced form of Equation (4.7) based on Townsend (1994) is ܿ�� = ܾ� + ��ܿ�̅ + ��ݕ�� + ���  ,    (4.8) 
where ܿ�̅  is average consumption in the village, ݕ��  represents a household’s 
idiosyncratic variables, in this case, income, and ��� is an i.i.d. error term with mean 
zero.  
  We assume measurement errors in ݕ��: ݕ�� = ݕ��∗ + ߳�� ,     (4.9) 
Then, Equation (4.8) will become ܿ�� = ܾ� + ��ܿ�̅ + ��ݕ�� + ��� − ��߳�� ,   (4.10) 
By taking first differences, we obtain ∆ܿ�� = ܾ� + ��∆ܿ�̅ + ��Δݕ�� + ݑ�� ,    (4.11) ݑ�� = Δ��� − ��Δ߳�� ,    (4.12) 
where Δݕ�� represents household’s idiosyncratic income shocks.  
A full risk sharing can be achieved when the null hypothesis of �� = Ͳ is accepted 
across all households within the village7. In other words, if the economy (say a village) 
achieves Pareto optimal risk sharing among villages, Δܿ�� should respond only to the 
village level shocks ∆ܿ�̅ so that the size of �� shows excess sensibility of consumption 
to idiosyncratic income shocks. A relatively large positive value of �� indicates that 
individual i is less able to cope with such shocks.  
  Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) examined thoroughly the Townsend (1994) model to 
prove that his estimates of �� had a downward bias. They insisted that the second term 
of Equation (4.11)—��∆ܿ�̅—should be replaced by time-village dummies ∑  ��  �, in 
                                                 
7
 An alternative hypothesis (�� = ͳ) implies a complete autarky or the complete lack of 
risk-sharing mechanisms. 
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case of assuming the uniform time preference and risk aversion across households in the 
village. The parameter �  can more accurately reflect the effects of idiosyncratic 
income shocks Δݕ��, because the time-village dummies absorb all the aggregate shocks 
that occur within the village economy. In addition, restrictions on the parameters, ܾ� = ܾ, �� = �, �� = �   ∀�, are usually imposed by assuming uniform time preferences 
and risk aversion across households in using developing countries’ panel data because 
the available period is typically short.  ∆ܿ�� = ܾ + ∑  ��  � + �Δݕ�� + ݑ��  ,   (4.13) 
Parameter � is also called the excess sensitivity parameter because it becomes positive 
when any kind of liquidity constraints and imperfect credit and/or insurance market 
mechanisms are observed.  
 Since the panel data used in this study is of two periods (2003 and 2007), the model to 
be estimated takes the form of a cross-section. Δܿ� = ߙ௩ + �Δݕ� +   � + ݑ�  ,    (4.14) 
where ߙ௩ are village dummies,  � is a vector of household-specific factors that will 
affect the consumption change, and ݑ� is an i.i.d. error term with mean zero. 
 
4-3-3. Model with Emphasis on Welfare Loss 
  According to Kurosaki (2006a, 2009: Ch. 9), one of the problems in using a 
specification such as Equation (4.13) for a vulnerability analysis is that parameter � 
does not distinguish whether Δݕ�� is positive or negative. Parameter � in this case 
shows the extent to which a household needs to decrease its consumption level when hit 
by a negative income shock, as well as the extent to which it can afford to increase its 
consumption level when it enjoys a certain income increase. Therefore, it is necessary to 
separate the marginal effect of negative income shocks from that of positive income 
shocks to consumption. Only the degree to which a household is forced to decrease 
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consumption in response to negative income shocks should be regarded as vulnerability. 
Following Kurosaki (2006a, 2009: Ch. 9), a modified version of the model in Equation 
(4.14) is estimated in this study8.  Δܿ� = ߙ௩ + �ଵሺͳ −  �ሻΔݕ� + �ଶ �Δݕ� +   � + ݑ� ,   (4.15) 
where  � = ͳ if Δݕ� < Ͳ, ݑ�  is an i.i.d. error term with mean zero. Parameter �ଵ 
shows the extent to which consumption increases when income increases marginally for 
a household, after controlling for aggregate village shocks and household-specific 
factors  �, and �ଶ shows the extent to which consumption decreases when income 
decreases marginally for a similar household.  
 
4-4. Empirical Analyses and Results 
4-4-1. Summary Statistics 
  Table 4-1 presents summary statistics of variables used in the regression in this study9. 
The manner in which the variables are created is summarized in Appendix I. A 
significant drop in consumption and income was observed in 2003–2007. Weekly 
per-capita real consumption decreased, on average, by 8.8 Mexican pesos for food alone, 
and by 10.8 pesos in total. Furthermore, per-capita real income decreased by 6.3 pesos 
on average in the same period. In contrast, per-capita income between 2001 and 2002 
increased. This phenomenon is attributed to the poor households’ welfare loss caused by 
international and domestic food price increases during the period (Uchiyama, 2013; 
Attanasio et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2009; Valero-Gil and Valero, 2008). The table shows 
that half of the sampled households experienced income decline.  
                                                 
8
 Kochar (1995) estimated the effects of shocks on wage income and informal 
borrowings by considering the asymmetrical effects of positive and negative crop 
income shocks. Also, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) examined the effects of seasonal 
income fluctuation on the child school attendances by applying the same method.  
9
 Finally 12,243 households remain as a complete panel 2003-2007 after dropping zero 
or unreported income and upper and lower 1 percent of the sample as outliers.  
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  With respect to the household characteristics in the base year (2003), 24 percent of 
the household heads have never received education. Those who ended up in primary 
school account for 65 percent, while about 9.5 percent had some secondary school and 
only 2 percent had high school education or higher. The dropout rate is high: the 
author’s calculation based on the data shows that more than half of the household heads 
who had entered primary school did not graduate. Female-headed households account 
for 10 percent. The average age of the household heads is 46 years old, and 88 percent 
are married and 10 percent are divorced or separated. The average household size is 5.3 
people and the dependency ratio is 42.7. About 31 percent of the households are 
indigenous (that is, household heads speak indigenous languages). About 60 percent are 
beneficiary households of the CCT program in 2003. This percentage increases to 78.5 
percent because the “Control 2003” households start to receive benefits in 2004. 
Households that had self-consumption in the week they were interviewed account for 
6.3 percent. Households that own or cultivate lands account for about 63 percent. These 
households own or cultivate 4.8 hectares on average,  but the median farming 
household only owns or cultivates 2 hectares, implying that there are large numbers of 
small poor farmers and small numbers of large farmers. Land with full or partial 
irrigation accounts for 9.3 percent, which indicates that the most of land is rain-fed and, 
thus, the productivity must be low. About 26 percent of the households receive some 
kind of personal transfers (remittances) in cash or in kind. In addition, 32 percent of the 
households have members over 15 years old living away from home (migrants).  
  There are seven highly marginal pilot states selected from different parts of Mexico: 
four from Central Mexico (Hidalgo, Michoacán, Puebla, and Querétaro), one from 
North (San Luis Potosí), one from Gulf of Mexico (Veracruz), and one from Southern 
Pacific (Guerrero). The three treatment/control groups in the table correspond to the 
aforementioned village categories.  
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ΔC_i: Food 12243 -8.819 47.257 -338.668 267.406
ΔC_i: Total 11483 -10.787 61.177 -391.588 487.897
ΔY_i 12243 -6.259 47.072 -378.942 137.707
d 12243 0.503 0.500 0 1
(1-d) 12243 0.497 0.500 0 1
dΔY_i 12243 -15.857 39.953 -378.942 0.000
(1-d)ΔY_i 12243 9.598 17.753 0.000 137.707
ΔY_i: 2001-02 12243 1.223 21.480 -604.357 831.271
Food Consumption03 12243 71.116 43.968 10.435 391.298
Food Consumption07 12243 62.297 39.791 8.421 294.724
Total Consumption03 12243 90.736 56.469 9.885 415.187
Total Consumption07 11483 80.245 54.386 10.892 505.691
Income03 12243 28.946 43.764 0.607 392.972
Income07 12243 22.687 21.473 0.964 146.838
noedu03 12218 0.236 0.424 0 1
primary03 12218 0.649 0.477 0 1
secondary03 12218 0.095 0.293 0 1
highschool03 12218 0.011 0.105 0 1
technical03 12218 0.007 0.082 0 1
univ03 12218 0.002 0.048 0 1
female03 12240 0.100 0.300 0 1
age03 12236 46.268 14.620 3 98
married03 12242 0.877 0.329 0 1
divorced03 12242 0.099 0.299 0 1
total_member03 12243 5.246 2.315 1 19
depratio03 12243 42.678 23.848 0 100
indigenous03 12234 0.308 0.462 0 1
CCT_dum03 12243 0.592 0.492 0 1
selfcons_dum03 12243 0.063 0.244 0 1
land_dum03 12243 0.627 0.484 0 1
total_land_ha03 8119 4.776 10.048 1 200
irrigation03 7774 0.093 0.290 0 1
hhremit03 12243 0.256 0.437 0 1
hhmig_over15_dum03 12243 0.324 0.468 0 1
State12: Guerrero 12243 0.079 0.270 0 1
State13: Hidalgo 12243 0.104 0.306 0 1
State 16: Michoacán 12243 0.168 0.373 0 1
State 21: Puebla 12243 0.146 0.353 0 1
State 22: Querétaro 12243 0.077 0.267 0 1
State 24: San Luis Potosí 12243 0.162 0.369 0 1
State 30: Veracruz 12243 0.263 0.440 0 1
“Treatment 1998” 12243 0.477 0.499 0 1
“Treatment 2000” 12243 0.335 0.472 0 1
“Control 2003” 12243 0.188 0.390 0 1
Notes:
1) Consumptions and Incomes are shown in local currency in real terms (June 2011=100)
3) d  takes 1 if ΔY_i <  0
Source: Author's elaboration based on ENCEL 2003, 2007. 
Table 4-1. Summary Statistics
2) ΔC_i stands for changes in consumption 2003¬2007, and ΔY_i stands for changes in income 2003
¬2007.
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4-4-2. Basic Model 
  We assume endogeneity of observed changes in income in estimating Equation (4.14). 
Thus, the explanatory variables are replaced by fitted values using instrumental 
variables. The instruments include  � (household-specific factors that are likely to 
affect the households’ income changes and the degree of consumption smoothing to 
which they can achieve) and the changes in lagged income between 2001 and 200210 
that should be correlated with the income changes in 2003–2007. Food consumption 
and total consumption are used as explained variables (Δܿ�) in all models herein.  
  Table 4-2 presents the results of both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regressions on food consumption and on total consumption.  � 
consists of household size; the dependency ratio; the age, sex, marital status, ethnicity, 
and the education level of the household head, and the total hectares of land owned or 
cultivated by the household. Instruments include per-capita wage income changes in 
2001–2002, a land dummy (1 if a household owns or cultivates a land, 0 otherwise), and 
a migrant dummy (1 if a household has any member aged 15 years and older that has 
migrated to another place, 0 otherwise). Different specifications are applied by using 
irrigation (1 if a household has any irrigated land), CCT (1 if a household receives 
money benefit of CCT), self-consumption (1 if a household has self-consumption), and 
remittance (1 if a household receives personal transfers) dummies as  � (Model 1) or 
as instruments (Model 2) to check for robustness. Table 4-2 is limited to present 
estimated � coefficients. Complete results are shown in Appendix II (Table A4-2 and 
A4-3).  
   
                                                 
10
 The details of the income change in 2001–2002 are explained in Appendix I. The 
sum of retrospective wage earnings of household heads and spouses are used as a proxy 
of lagged household income changes because data for the newly added control group 
(Control 2003) is not available before 2003.  
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  The OLS estimation coefficients of � are about 0.14 for food consumption and 
about 0.18 for total consumption in both models, which is consistent with previous 
studies in terms of significance and magnitude. This implies that real food and total 
consumption rises (declines) by 0.14 and 0.18 Mexican pesos respectively when the real 
income rises (declines) 1 Mexican peso. The null hypothesis of full risk sharing is 
rejected at the 1 percent level. It is noteworthy that the coefficients for food 
consumption are smaller than the coefficients for total consumption, which implies that 
food consumption is better insured than total consumption. This result is consistent with 
most of the previous studies conducted in other developing countries11. Skoufias (2007) 
explains, in this respect, that an increase in household income increases the demand of 
                                                 
11
 IV estimates of three ICRISAT villages conducted by Ravallion and Chaudhuri 
(1997) range from 0.209 to 0.462 when using ‘flow accounting: FA’ income data, and 
from 0.120 to 0.336 when using ‘observable transaction: OT’ income data (Table IV). 
Kurosaki (2001: Table 8-6) also has similar results to those of Ravallion and Chaudhuri 
(1997) with the same Indian data. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the estimated ‘excess 
sensitivity’ parameters range from negative (essentially zero) to 0.54. (Deaton, 1993: 
Table 3) In addition, the estimation results of Grimard (1997) using the Côte d’Ivoire 
data are quite robust with coefficients all around 0.2 for different specifications and 
regression methods. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
β (OLS) 0.1402*** 0.1438*** 0.1816*** 0.1837***
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0162) (0.0162)
β (2SLS) 0.6423*** 0.5898*** 0.7509*** 0.6141***
(0.0834) (0.0644) (0.1048) (0.0807)
village dummies yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs 12349 12349 11442 11442
R-squared (OLS) 0.1376 0.1335 0.1613 0.1592
Chi2 (2SLS) 216028.91 128128.105 279507.618 41600701.430
Notes:
1) Huber¬White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 4-2. Regression Results of Equation (4.14)
Food Consumption Total Consumption
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luxury goods (non-food) more than that of necessities (such as food), and the opposite is 
true in case of a decrease in household income. The 2SLS coefficients are much larger 
than the OLS coefficients for both food and total consumptions, which confirms the 
downward bias in � owing to endogeneity as the theory predicts12.  
 
4-4-3. Model with Emphasis on Welfare Loss 
  Table 4-3 presents the OLS13 regression results of Equation (4.15), in which we 
distinguish the risk-sharing effects against negative income changes (�ଶ) from those 
against positive income changes (�ଵ). The results are quite robust regardless of the 
specifications. Two models are shown in the table, whose specifications are the same as 
those in Table 4-2.  
 
  
 
                                                 
12
 One can infer from the 2SLS regression results that a downward bias caused by 
measurement errors is greater than other possible biases attributed to specification errors 
or omitted variables. 
13
 Only the OLS regression results are shown here, because IV regression results by 
using the same instruments as in the basic model were not robust, possibly because of 
weak instruments. This will remain for a future study.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
β 1 0.3482*** 0.3566*** 0.4367*** 0.4416***
(0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0413) (0.0412 )
β 2 0.0857*** 0.0879*** 0.1146*** 0.1158***
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0187) (0.0187)
village dummies yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs 12199 12199 11442 11442
R-squared 0.1535 0.1487 0.1667 0.1647
Notes:
1) Huber¬White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 4-3. OLS Regression Results of Equation (4.15)
Food Consumption Total Consumption
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The results show that �ଵ  (for positive income changes) is 0.35-0.36 for food 
consumption and 0.44 for total consumption, while �ଶ (for negative income changes) 
is 0.09 for food consumption and 0.12 for total consumption. There are two interesting 
facts to discuss. First, it is noteworthy that the coefficients on positive income shocks 
(�ଵ) are much larger than the coefficients on negative income shocks (�ଶ) for both food 
and total consumptions (0.35 (�ଵ) versus 0.08 (�ଶ) in food consumption, and 0.44 (�ଵ) 
versus 0.12 (�ଶ) in total consumption, respectively)14. One can infer that risk-sharing 
mechanisms are well developed to deal with negative shocks (in other words, 
vulnerability) at the village level in rural Mexico. Another possible explanation could be 
the downward rigidity of food demand: the households that suffered from negative 
income changes are poorer households living far below the subsistence level, and thus, 
these cannot decrease their consumption level despite the negative shocks.  
Second, �  values are larger in total consumption than in food consumption 
regardless of the positive or negative shocks, which confirms the implications of the 
basic model of Equation (4.14). However, the discrepancies of � between food and 
total consumptions are much larger in the case of positive income shocks (�ଵ): 
(�ଵ்௢��� −  �ଵ�௢௢ௗ ) > (�ଶ்௢��� −  �ଶ�௢௢ௗ ). Differences of coefficients are 0.09 
(0.44-0.35) in the case of �ଵ and 0.03 (0.12-0.09) in the case of �ଶ. This fact implies 
that the consumption elasticity to positive income shocks is higher and that households 
tend to increase expenditure on non-food (luxury) goods when income increases.  
 
4-4-4. Model with CCT Effects 
4-4-4-1. Outline of Mexico’s CCT Program: PROGRESA-Oportunidades 
It has been more than 15 years since Mexico’s CCT program: Education, Health and 
                                                 
14
 The 2 SLS estimates of �  for negative income shocks presented by Kurosaki 
(2006a; 2009: Ch.9) varied depending on specifications. The OLS results of this study 
could be more consistent with the prediction of the theory on vulnerability. 
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Nutrition Program (Programa de Educación, Salud e Alimentación: PROGRESA) was 
started in 1997 to replace all existing poverty programs. Targeting its benefits directly to 
the population in extreme poverty in rural areas, the program was intended (1) to 
alleviate current poverty through monetary and in-kind benefits and (2) to reduce future 
levels of poverty by encouraging investment in education, health and nutrition (Skoufias, 
2007). The program, which was renamed “Oportunidades” after the change of 
government in 2000, has finally achieved including over 5 million families in all 
Mexican states (Wood et al., 2009). In this study, the program is designated as 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades. 
The education component of PROGRESA-Oportunidades is designed to increase 
school enrollment among youth in Mexico’s poor rural communities by making 
educational grants available to pupil’s mothers, with the requirement that greater than 
85 percent attendance be achieved. In the area of health and nutrition, 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades includes distribution of nutritional supplements, education 
related to hygiene and nutrition, and monetary transfers for the purchase of food. 
Receipt of monetary transfers and nutritional supplements is tied to mandatory visits to 
public clinics for health care15. The average monthly payment (received every two 
months) by a beneficiary family amounts to 20 percent of the value of monthly 
consumption expenditures prior to the initiation of the program. One additional 
requirement of the PROGRESA-Oportunidades program is that households benefiting 
from PROGRESA-Oportunidades were obligated to stop receiving benefits from other 
programs (Skoufias, 2005).  
 Levy (2006), the key person of designing and introducing 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades under the Zedillo administration, regards the redistribution 
of income to families in extreme poverty by increasing their certainty of having a 
                                                 
15
 This aspect of the program emphasizes targeting benefits to children under five, and 
pregnant and lactating women (Skoufias, 2005). 
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minimum level of consumption as one of the major objectives of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades, in addition to the improvement of child schooling and 
poor families’ health and nutrition status. In this section, the discussion centers on 
whether PROGRESA-Oportunidades has contributed to reduce current poverty or 
vulnerability of the eligible households by reinforcing the existing risk-sharing 
mechanisms through cash transfers16.  
 
4-4-4-2. Regression Results 
  Table 4-4 presents OLS regression results of Equations (4.14) and (4.15) with three 
subsamples, “Treatment 1998,” “Treatment 2000,” and “Control 2003” to examine the 
CCT’s effects on risk sharing. Each model’s specifications are the same as those in the 
previous sections.  
  Table 4-4-1, with the basic model, shows that coefficient � is smallest in “Treatment 
1998” groups, second smallest in “Treatment 2000” and largest in “Control 2003” 
groups for both food (0.11, 0.15, and 0.20, respectively) and total consumptions (0.17, 
0.19, and 0.21-0.22, respectively). The result suggests that the longer the exposure to 
the CCT program, the better insured the household, which supports the hypothesis that 
CCT influences poverty reduction and mitigating vulnerability by securing a minimum 
income level. Moreover, the results imply that risk-sharing mechanisms are functioning 
                                                 
16
 There are several previous studies on consumption smoothing effects of CCT in 
Mexico. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2006; 2009) confirm the indirect effect, or spillover 
effect, of PROGRESA-Oportunidades cash transfers to increase the consumption of 
ineligible households living in the same treatment village. They argue that the 
availability of additional liquidity in the network (through CCT cash transfers) causes 
changes in the local credit and insurance markets, which enables not only treated 
households but also non-treated households to reduce their savings and increase 
consumption. Skoufias (2007) conducted an empirical analysis of the risk insurance 
model using three rounds of ENCEL panel data of 1998–1999. The effect of 
PROGRESA-Oportunidades on the improvement of the pre-existing risk sharing within 
villages was not statistically significant. He attributed this result to the short period of 
time (1.5 years) after the program implementation.  
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better for food consumption than for total consumption in “Treatment 1998” and 
“Treatment 2000” villages (villages that have longer exposure to CCT since 1998 and 
2000, respectively). In contrast, there is almost no difference in the magnitude of 
coefficients, �, between food consumption (0.20) and total consumption (0.21-0.22)  
in “Control 2003” group. This fact might imply that longer exposure to CCT is more 
effective in securing the basic needs, especially food consumption. Another explanation 
lies in omitted variable biases because of different profiles of the original sample groups 
(“Treatment 1998” and “Treatment 2000”) and the newly added control group (“Control 
2003”), which may remain even after controlling for village-specific and observable 
household-specific characteristics in the regression.  
  Table 4-4-2 shows the OLS regression results of Equation (4.15), by distinguishing 
the negative income shocks from positive income shocks. All but one of the coefficients 
are significant and similar to the estimates in Table 4-3. However, it is difficult to 
confirm the CCT effects except in the coefficients of negative income shocks (�ଶ) in 
food consumption. The coefficients �ଶ for food consumption are 0.5, 0.11, and 0.15 
respectively for “Treatment 1998,” “Treatment 2000” and “Control 2003,” which 
clearly indicates that households are relatively well insured (�ଶ are relatively close to 
zero, but the null hypothesis rejected.) and that longer exposure to CCT enhances the 
risk-sharing mechanisms in the village. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis 
that CCT transfers succeed in securing the basic needs of poor households.  
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Variables T1998 T2000 C2003 T1998 T2000 C2003
Food Consumption
β 0.1118*** 0.1472*** 0.2027*** 0.1147*** 0.1518*** 0.2041***
(0.0163) (0.0214) (0.0339) (0.0164) (0.0214) (0.0340)
Total Consumption
β 0.1653*** 0.1862*** 0.2111*** 0.1655*** 0.1905*** 0.2163***
(0.0212) (0.0277) (0.0465) (0.0213) (0.0274) (0.0460)
village dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs (Food) 5819 4090 2290 5819 4090 2290
R-squared (Food) 0.1575 0.1389 0.1532 0.1516 0.1334 0.1494
No. of Obs (Total) 5450 3848 2144 5450 3848 2144
R-squared (Total) 0.1825 0.1455 0.1464 0.1788 0.1435 0.1456
Notes:
1) Huber¬White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
T1998 T2000 C2003 T1998 T2000 C2003
Food Consumption
β 1 0.3632*** 0.3197*** 0.3308*** 0.3732*** 0.3245*** 0.3396***
(0.0437) (0.0532) (0.0637) (0.0437) (0.0530) (0.0636)
β 2 0.0538*** 0.1055*** 0.1524*** 0.0551*** 0.1095*** 0.1514***
(0.0183) (0.0250) (0.0447) (0.0182) (0.0251) (0.0444)
Total Consumption
β 1 0.4978*** 0.3495*** 0.4179*** 0.5057*** 0.3546*** 0.4233***
(0.0641) (0.0703) (0.0827) (0.0642) (0.0696) (0.0828)
β 2 0.0888*** 0.1450*** 0.1341** 0.0873*** 0.1486*** 0.1398**
(0.0230) (0.0328) (0.0606) (0.0229) (0.0327) (0.0599)
village dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs (Food) 5819 4090 2290 5819 4090 2290
R-squared (Food) 0.1655 0.1429 0.156 0.1601 0.1374 0.1526
No. of Obs (Total) 5450 3848 2144 5450 3848 2144
R-squared (Total) 0.1908 0.1477 0.1507 0.1876 0.1457 0.1498
Notes:
1) Huber¬White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 4-4-1. OLS Regression Results of Equation (4.14)
Model 1 Model 2
Table 4-4-2. OLS Regression Results of Equation (4.15)
Model 1 Model 2
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4-5. Concluding Remarks 
  Three models were estimated to examine the risk-sharing mechanisms in rural 
Mexico using household panel data. The first model, examining the general risk sharing 
at the village level, revealed that risk-sharing mechanisms are incomplete, but work 
better for food consumption than for total consumption, which is consistent with 
previous studies. The second model, by focusing on the welfare loss, revealed that 
households are much better insured from negative income shocks than from positive 
income shocks, which is favorable in the presence of vulnerability. The third model, 
which includes CCT effects on risk sharing, confirmed the hypothesis that CCT 
reinforces the risk-sharing mechanisms of the treatment villages. The CCT effects were 
more apparent in securing poor households’ basic needs (negative income shocks to 
food consumption).  
Overall, the results support the hypothesis that risk-sharing mechanisms in rural 
Mexico offer better insurance in securing basic needs such as food and thus play 
important roles when households suffer from negative income shocks. In addition, CCT 
enhances the existent risk-sharing mechanisms. The risk-sharing mechanisms, 
reinforced by CCT, in turn, serve to mitigate the liquidity constraints (vulnerability) of 
poor households. However, one should take into consideration the possibility of 
downward rigidity of food demand that vulnerable households living below subsistence 
levels cannot decrease their consumption further even when hit by negative income 
shocks. More disaggregated analyses, such as quintile regressions, would be necessary 
to draw a more precise conclusion in this respect, which will remain for a future study.  
The analyses of this study were based on two-period cross-sectional panel data. 
However, as mentioned above, ENCEL data has nine rounds in total, and the tenth 
survey was conducted in 2011. Moreover, since 2003, food prices have constantly 
increased in tandem with the international food price crisis, which reached its peak in 
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2008 and 2011. This study considered the price shock only as a part of the village-level 
macro shocks in general. The sample would have to be expanded to more than three 
periods to more precisely account for the influence of price shocks (including the 
Lehman shock, when new data becomes available), and to enable further robustness 
checks of this study’s conclusion.  
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APPENDIX I  
Variables 
 
Household real per-capita food consumption: First, we construct each household’s 
weekly food consumption by summing up the reported amount of weekly food 
consumption and the estimated weekly self-consumption. Then we divide the 
household’s weekly food consumption by the number of household members to 
ascertain the per-capita weekly food consumption. In estimating the amount of 
self-consumption, we first calculate the median state price of each item using each 
household’s reported amounts of weekly purchase and the expenditure on the item. 
Then, we multiply the amount of reported self-consumption by the estimated unit 
median price of the state. Per-capita food consumption is deflated by the annual average 
food CPI17. 
 
Household real per-capita total consumption: We construct the household real 
per-capita total consumption in the same way as the food consumption described above 
by using the reported amount of weekly total consumption of food and non-food items. 
Per-capita total consumption is deflated by the annual average general CPI.  
 
Household real per-capita income in 2003 and 2007: This includes all household 
members’ wages, pensions, bonuses, monetary institutional transfers (including CCT), 
agricultural sales, and non-agricultural sales. It excludes personal transfers (including 
remittances), non-labor or irregular incomes such as sales of assets (houses, cars, home 
electronics, etc.), inheritance, lottery, gifts, and donations. Personal transfers are 
                                                 
17
 Banco de México Estadísticas. 
 http://www.banxico.org.mx/estadisticas/index.html  
(June 2001=100) 
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excluded because they are more likely to reflect ex-post adjustments to shocks, as 
Skoufias (2007) argues. The reported units of each income sources vary from daily, 
weekly, monthly to annual. Thus, we estimate the weekly amount of each income source 
and sum these up to find weekly household income. Then, we divide the weekly total 
income by the number of household members and deflated it by the annual average 
general CPI. Households that have any kind of unreported income sources are dropped 
from the sample.  
 
Household real per-capita income in 2001 and 2002: This consists of the sum of the 
household head and spouse’s retrospective weekly wage income divided by the number 
of household members and deflated by the average annual general CPI.  
 
Education dummies: Primary/Secondary/Highschool education refers to those who have 
enrolled in a primary/secondary school or high school regardless of whether they 
graduated. Technical education refers to those who have enrolled in any 
technical/vocational school (including teacher’s college). University education refers to 
those who have enrolled in a university and higher (including those who graduated from 
university and who have entered into/graduated from the post-graduate level).  
 
Household demographic variables: The total number of household members refers to 
the members who live in the same house regularly, and excludes household members 
who live separately for more than one year, who live in the same place, but only 
temporarily, and who have expired. The dependency ratio is the proportion of household 
members under 14 years and over 65 years of age (non-labor force) to the number of 
household members aged 15–64 (labor force).  
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APPENDIX II 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
X_i:
primary03  -3.021***  -3.021***  -3.263***  -3.263***
secondary03  -2.964*  -2.964*  -2.985*  -2.985*
highschool03  -15.311***  -15.311***  -14.798***  -14.798***
technical03  -10.714 -10.714 -11.192 -11.192
univ03  -17.271 -17.271 -15.144 -15.144
total_member03  1.184***  1.184***  1.248***  1.248***
depratio03  0.172***  0.172***  0.166***  0.166***
female03  2.756 2.756  2.670 2.670
age03  -0.436***  -0.436***  -0.436***  -0.436***
married03  3.147 3.147 4.631 4.631
divorced03  1.400  1.400 2.868 2.868
indigenous03  4.456**  4.456**  4.269**  4.269***
total_land_ha03  -0.368***  -0.368***  -0.334*** -0.334
irrigation03  -9.623***  -10.078***
CCT_dum03  -0.196 -0.049
selfcons_dum03  -4.630***  -4.490***
hhremit03  -9.907***  -9.781***
Instruments:
Δy_i , t-1 (2001-2002)  -0.077**  -0.077**  -0.075**  -0.075**
land_dum03  -11.477***  -11.477***  -12.242***  -12.242***
hhmig_over15_dum03  -6.177***  -6.177***  -5.833***  -5.833***
hhremit03 -0.196 -0.049
selfcons_dum03  -9.907***  -9.781***
CCT03_dum  -4.630***  -4.490***
irrigation03  -9.623***  -10.078***
_cons 33.5538 33.554***  34.506*** 34.506***
village dummies yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs 12349 12349 11442 11442
R-suqared 0.1628 0.163 0.170 0.170
F statistics 599.11 599.110 165.840 165.840
Notes:
1) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
2) Δy_i  stands for changes in income.
Table A4-2. Regression Results of the First Stage of Equation (4.14)
Food Consumption Total Consumption
Instrumented: Δy_i ,t (2003-2007)
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APPENDIX IV 
 
 
  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
β 1 0.3482*** 0.3566*** 0.4367*** 0.4416***
β 2 0.0857*** 0.0879*** 0.1146*** 0.1158***
primary03 -1.2846 -1.449 -3.3487** -3.4668**
secondary03 -2.9315* -3.1465* -4.4369* -4.6321*
highschool03 -1.9444 -2.1003 -0.4884 -0.7297
technical03 -12.8771** -12.7934** 7.6039 7.53
univ03 -21.2319* -21.7382* -4.1653 -4.8416
total_member03 1.5356*** 1.5613*** 2.3217*** 2.3915***
depratio03 0.1399*** 0.1374*** 0.2200*** 0.2176***
female03 1.0751 0.302 -3.725 -4.4647
age03 -0.3098*** -0.3287*** -0.4065*** -0.4277***
married03 -1.638 -1.8057 6.2803 6.2629
divorced03 -9.7769** -9.6806** 2.3343 2.5161
indigenous03 -1.9628 -1.9701 1.4266 1.4434
total_land_ha03 0.0337 0.0274 -0.001 -0.0063
irrigation03 0.1038 0.2728
CCT_dum03 1.3924 2.4364
selfcons_dum03 -12.5587*** -8.6920***
hhremit03 -3.2141*** -3.9936***
_cons -4.0236 -5.5269 21.7480* 20.2716
              
village dummies yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs 12199 12199 11442 11442
R-suqared 0.1535 0.1487 0.1667 0.1647
Table A4-4. OLS Regression Results of Equation (4.15)
Food Consumption Total Consumption
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 based on Huber White heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors.
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APPENDIX V 
 
Variables T1998 T2000 C2003 T1998 T2000 C2003
β 0.1118*** 0.1472*** 0.2027*** 0.1653*** 0.1862*** 0.2111***
primary03 -1.2907 0.231 -3.7309 -1.6736 -1.9116 -10.2144***
secondary03 -1.2473 -0.9889 -7.3702* -2.3883 -1.4368 -11.8232**
highschool & higher03 -8.7846 3.3221 -15.4300** -2.2612 21.4276** -11.3939
total_member03 1.6600*** 1.2776*** 0.7885 2.4530*** 2.1418*** 1.1542*
depratio03 0.1867*** 0.0698* 0.2495*** 0.2618*** 0.1695*** 0.3291***
female03 -1.0932 -0.4971 9.6684 -3.3369 -7.7833 4.6021
age03 -0.3720*** -0.2524*** -0.2449*** -0.4675*** -0.3247*** -0.3575***
married03 4.8416 -2.4848 -12.5298 11.0675* 2.8077 4.6126
divorced03 -1.1734 -9.8364 -27.8097*** 7.4984 0.7995 -5.6603
indigenous03 -4.307 1.6535 -3.5049 -1.1446 4.4878 3.8628
total_land_ha03 -0.0178 0.1085 0.1153 -0.1008 0.1537 0.1249
irrigation03 0.5118 -1.4598 3.7427 4.2671 -2.5263 -3.0187
CCT_dum03 0.8579 1.9946 0.3455 3.7286* 1.0271 -4.843
selfcons_dum03 -14.2189*** -11.2653*** -12.6642*** -11.7020*** -6.8418** -6.1886
hhremit03 -2.9313* -4.7754*** -2.1503 -4.3671** -5.0776** -2.4087
_cons -23.9998*** 33.0394*** 9.7111 -44.7135*** -68.1755*** 33.6517*
              
village dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs 5819 4090 2290 5450 3848 2144
R-suqared 0.1575 0.1389 0.1532 0.1825 0.1455 0.1464
Notes: 
1) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.0 1 based on Huber¬White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
2) The results are based on the estimation of Model 1.
Variables T1998 T2000 C2003 T1998 T2000 C2003
β 1 0.3632*** 0.3197*** 0.3308*** 0.4978*** 0.3495*** 0.4179***
β 2 0.0538*** 0.1055*** 0.1524*** 0.0888*** 0.1450*** 0.1341**
primary03 -1.3862 0.1357 -4.0994 -1.7005 -2.0753 -10.9160***
secondary03 -1.7352 -1.5119 -7.7163* -2.825 -2.0331 -12.4322**
highschool & higher03 -10.1581* 3.1056 -16.8231** -3.9719 21.2146** -13.7113
total_member03 1.7951*** 1.3998*** 0.9696* 2.6303*** 2.2605*** 1.4437**
depratio03 0.1653*** 0.0585 0.2325*** 0.2332*** 0.1581*** 0.3020***
female03 -1.6861 -0.1689 9.805 -4.0535 -7.5116 5.0006
age03 -0.3652*** -0.2519*** -0.2621*** -0.4568*** -0.3261*** -0.3815***
married03 4.3451 -2.4892 -11.8344 10.3817 2.7539 5.5939
divorced03 -0.7679 -9.9014* -27.5046*** 7.9903 0.7112 -5.5427
indigenous03 -4.238 1.924 -3.3512 -1.0109 4.7535 4.1721
total_land_ha03 -0.0182 0.1097 0.098 -0.1024 0.1543 0.1005
irrigation03 0.0162 -1.3306 3.0778 3.7905 -2.405 -3.8991
CCT_dum03 0.8718 2.3849 0.4506 3.6406* 1.453 -4.7281
selfcons_dum03 -13.7424*** -11.1827*** -12.1838*** -11.1817*** -6.8032** -5.4235
hhremit03 -2.6127* -4.5832** -2.14 -3.9341* -4.9002** -2.5448
_cons -29.9494*** -80.0870*** 6.3086 -29.0095** -69.0818*** 28.195
village dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of Obs 5819 4090 2290 5450 3848 2144
R-suqared 0.1655 0.1429 0.156 0.1908 0.1477 0.1507
Notes: 
1) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 based on Huber-White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
2) The results are based on the estimation of Model 1.
Table A4-5-1. OLS Regression Results of Equation (4.14)
Food Consumption Total Consumption
Table A4-5-2. OLS Regression Results of Equation (4.15)
Food Consumption Total Consumption
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